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EMPLOYED ALGORITHMS: A LABOR MODEL
OF CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR AI
MIHAILIS E. DIAMANTIS†
ABSTRACT
The workforce is digitizing. Leading consultancies estimate that
algorithmic systems will replace 45 percent of human-held jobs by
2030. One feature that algorithms share with the human employees they
are replacing is their capacity to cause harm. Even today, corporate
algorithms discriminate against loan applicants, manipulate stock
markets, collude over prices, and cause traffic deaths. Ordinarily,
corporate employers would be responsible for these injuries, but the
rules for assessing corporate liability arose at a time when only humans
could act on behalf of corporations. Those rules apply awkwardly, if at
all, to silicon. Some corporations have already discovered this legal
loophole and are rapidly automating business functions to limit their
own liability risk.
This Article seeks a way to hold corporations accountable for the
harms of their digital workforce: some algorithms should be treated,
for liability purposes, as corporate employees. Drawing on existing
functional characterizations of employment, the Article defines the
concept of an “employed algorithm” as one over which a corporation
exercises substantial control and from which it derives substantial
benefits. If a corporation employs an algorithm that causes criminal or
civil harm, the corporation should be liable just as if the algorithm were
a human employee. Plaintiffs and prosecutors could then leverage
existing, employee-focused liability rules to hold corporations
accountable when the digital workforce transgresses.
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“A robot must obey orders given it by human beings.”
—The Second Law of Robotics1

1.

ISAAC ASIMOV, I, ROBOT 40 (1950).
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INTRODUCTION
Robots and algorithms will replace almost half of existing jobs in
the coming decade.2 Truck drivers,3 warehouse personnel,4 assembly
line workers,5 and office staff6 are among those whose trades face the
greatest threat of obsolescence. High-skill professions are not immune
either. Algorithms that review documents,7 trade stocks,8 and diagnose
patients9 are knocking at the door of legal, investment, and medical
services. The human toll of this mass labor displacement could be
2. Michael Chui, James Manyika & Mehdi Miremadi, Where Machines Could Replace
Humans—and Where They Can’t (Yet), MCKINSEY Q. (July 8, 2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/
business-functions/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/where-machines-could-replace-humans-andwhere-they-cant-yet [https://perma.cc/Q24J-3RRU] (“[C]urrently demonstrated technologies
could automate 45 percent of the activities people are paid to perform . . . .”). This Article uses
“robot” and “algorithm” almost interchangeably. Technically, robots have physical form, whereas
algorithms do not. For present purposes, that distinction does not matter. It influences the type
of injury each can cause, but not whether they can injure.
3. Patrice Taddonio, Could the Rise of Artificial Intelligence Put Truckers’ Jobs in Peril?,
PBS (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/could-the-rise-of-artificial-intelli
gence-put-truckers-jobs-in-peril [https://perma.cc/ZF96-UVPH].
4. Jeffrey Dastin, Exclusive: Amazon Rolls Out Machines That Pack Orders and Replace
Jobs, REUTERS (May 13, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-automationexclusive/exclusive-amazon-rolls-out-machines-that-pack-orders-and-replace-jobsidUSKCN1SJ0X1 [https://perma.cc/SF4R-FQKY].
5. Alana Semuels, Millions of Americans Have Lost Jobs in the Pandemic—and Robots
and AI Are Replacing Them Faster Than Ever, TIME (Aug. 6, 2020), https://time.com/5876604/
machines-jobs-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/D3WN-9KWS] (“[A] recycling company in
Virginia[] purchased four AMP robots in 2019 for its Roanoke facility, deploying them on
assembly lines to ensure the paper and plastic streams were free of misplaced materials.”).
6. Will Knight, AI Is Coming for Your Most Mind-Numbing Office Tasks, WIRED (Mar.
14, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/ai-coming-most-mind-numbing-office-tasks
[https://perma.cc/8CSN-JP6W] (“Simple software automation is eliminating some particularly
repetitive jobs, such as basic data entry . . . .”).
7. Lauri Donahue, Commentary, A Primer on Using Artificial Intelligence in the Legal
Profession, JOLT DIG. (Jan. 3, 2018), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/a-primer-on-using-artif
icial-intelligence-in-the-legal-profession [https://perma.cc/ZF56-D3D5] (“[L]egal work that
depends on collating and analyzing historical data such as past judicial decisions, including legal
opinions or evaluating likely litigation outcomes, will become the dominion of AI.”).
8. William Baldwin, The Artificially Intelligent Investor: AI and the Future of Stock Picking,
FORBES (Dec. 9, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/baldwin/2019/12/09/connecting-amillion-dots [https://perma.cc/2ZHJ-2J8R] (“EquBot, which says its funds are the only actively
managed ETFs using AI, won’t have this turf to itself for long. IBM is selling AI up and down
Wall Street.”).
9. Ohad Oren, Bernard J. Gersh & Deepak L. Bhatt, Artificial Intelligence in Medical
Imaging: Switching from Radiographic Pathological Data to Clinically Meaningful Endpoints, 2
LANCET DIGIT. HEALTH (Sept. 2020), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/landig/article/PIIS25
89-7500(20)30160-6/fulltext [https://perma.cc/CH6S-HECK] (“The enhanced reading performance of
AI could be exploited to improve patient selection for intervention by identifying mild structural
or dynamic changes that correlate with worse outcomes.”).
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staggering as tens of millions of workers find themselves with no
paycheck and no professional calling. Labor scholars have sounded the
alarm, calling for aggressive retraining programs to prepare workers
for a new technological landscape.10
Even if, as some economists predict, automation creates one new
job for every job lost,11 the fact remains that the workforce is becoming
increasingly digital. Humans work alongside algorithms—sometimes
independently, sometimes overseeing them, sometimes overseen by
them. These corporate algorithms constitute a growing digital
workforce, and this workforce is creating another public threat that has
received far less attention. As the human element plays a shrinking role
in corporate activity, corporations will become increasingly immune
from liability for harms they cause. Unshackled from the law’s
disciplinary influence, corporations cannot be trustworthy stewards of
our economies, lives, and livelihoods.
Corporate algorithms can and do hurt people. “As robotics and
artificial intelligence systems increasingly integrate into our society,
they will do bad things.”12 For proof, one need look no further than
current headlines. Algorithmic discrimination has probably grabbed
the most news space, as when federal agencies uncovered corporate
hiring algorithms that assign lower scores to applicants with Blacksounding names or degrees from women’s colleges.13 But corporate

10. Edward L. Rubin, Beneficial Precaution: A Proposed Approach to Uncertain
Technological Dangers, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 359, 391 (2020) (“[T]here will be massive
job displacement and a corresponding need to retrain unemployed workers for those positions
that are available in the new economy.”); Joshua La Bella, Hey Siri, What Is California Doing To
Prepare for the Growth of Artificial Intelligence?, 51 U. PAC. L. REV. 315, 317 (2020).
11. See WORLD ECON. F., THE FUTURE OF JOBS REPORT 8–9 (2018), http://www3.wefor
um.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Jobs_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/BGC6-NWBT] (finding “extensive
evidence of accelerating demand for a variety of wholly new specialist roles related to
understanding and leveraging the latest emerging technologies: AI and Machine Learning
Specialists, Big Data Specialists, Process Automation Experts, Information Security Analysts,
User Experience and Human-Machine Interaction Designers, Robotics Engineers and
Blockchain Specialists”).
12. Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1311
(2019).
13. See Khari Johnson, Feds Warn Against Discriminatory Hiring Algorithms, WIRED (May
16, 2022, 10:25 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/ai-hiring-bias-doj-eecc-guidance [https://per
ma.cc/NEN9-GLTU]; see also Robin Nunn, Discrimination and Algorithms in Financial Services:
Unintended Consequences of AI, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.
dwt.com/blogs/financial-services-law-advisor/2018/03/discrimination-and-algorithms-in-financial
-service [https://perma.cc/33KN-NJ4F] (discussing “AI’s so called ‘white guy problem’”).
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algorithms have also manipulated stock markets,14 colluded over
prices,15 and caused traffic deaths.16 As algorithms become more
sophisticated and occupy even larger economic and social roles, the
scope and severity of algorithmic misconduct will continue to grow.
Corporate law is not equipped to handle the evolving sources of
corporate harm. The general law of corporate liability originated in an
age when only humans could act on behalf of corporations. For a
corporation to be liable, the law requires that a corporate employee
cause harm while intending to benefit the corporation and while acting
within the scope of their employment.17 Algorithms are not employees.
Nor do algorithms have intentions or scopes of employment. So current
law falls short when corporate algorithms, rather than employees,
cause harm. Corporations can escape accountability for harmful
algorithmic conduct—like traffic accidents18 and discriminatory
lending19—for which they would ordinarily be liable.
There is no easy fix for this growing gap in corporate
accountability. Forcing corporations to limit their use of algorithms
would unacceptably restrain innovation and technological progress.20
It would also hobble domestic corporations in the fierce race with
foreign competitors for dominance over the next stage of economic
14. Enrique Martínez-Miranda, Peter McBurney & Matthew J. Howard, Learning Unfair
Trading: A Market Manipulation Analysis from the Reinforcement Learning Perspective, KING’S
COLL. LONDON (2015), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1511.00740.pdf [https://perma.cc/58BN-XFX3]; Renato
Zamagna, The Future of Trading Belongs to Artificial Intelligence, MEDIUM (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://medium.com/datadriveninvestor/the-future-of-trading-belong-to-artificial-intelligence-a4
d5887cb677 [https://perma.cc/TYX3-Y7WD].
15. Greg Rosalsky, When Computers Collude, NPR (Apr. 2, 2019, 7:30 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2019/04/02/708876202/when-computers-collude [https://per
ma.cc/WGG5-3B84].
16. Bryan Pietsch, 2 Killed in Driverless Tesla Car Crash, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/18/business/tesla-fatal-crash-texas.html [https://per
ma.cc/ZSP4-CCHX].
17. See 27 AM. JUR. 2D Employment Relationship § 356 (2022).
18. See, e.g., Angie Schmitt, Uber Got Off the Hook for Killing a Pedestrian with Its SelfDriving Car, STREETSBLOG USA (Mar. 8, 2019), https://usa.streetsblog.org/2019/03/08/uber-gotoff-the-hook-for-killing-a-pedestrian-with-its-self-driving-car [https://perma.cc/HHN7-F3A4].
19. Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
671, 711–12, 726 (2016).
20. Jacques Bughin, Jeongmin Seong, James Manyika, Michael Chui & Raoul Joshi, Notes
from the AI Frontier: Modeling the Impact of AI on the World Economy, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST.
(Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/artificial-intelligence/notes-from-the
-ai-frontier-modeling-the-impact-of-ai-on-the-world-economy [https://perma.cc/YPN7-YR2L] (“AI
has the potential to deliver additional global economic activity of around $13 trillion by 2030 . . .
. This amounts to 1.2 percent additional GDP growth per year. If delivered, this impact would
compare well with that of other general-purpose technologies through history.”).
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development.21 Simply using current law more creatively will not close
the gap either. Plaintiffs and prosecutors relying on current law to hold
corporations accountable must find a culpable employee and trace
liability through them to the corporation.22 Sometimes this is possible,
as when an employee negligently designs or purposely misuses an
algorithm. However, even today, it is often impossible to find such an
employee behind algorithmic harm.23 Smart algorithms can misbehave
even if all humans involved act innocently and responsibly.24 As
algorithms become more intelligent and autonomous, the link between
algorithmic harm and any identifiable human deficiency will become
increasingly tenuous.
Simply designing algorithms that are more obedient will not work
either because, contrary to Isaac Asimov’s Second Law of Robotics,
algorithms should not inflexibly obey human orders. Of course, to the
extent some algorithmic harms are foreseeable, software developers
can and should hardcode preventive measures.25 But the awesome
potential of today’s most advanced algorithms is their
unpredictability.26 Machine learning performs so well because it does
not follow a sequence of human commands; instead, through training
on vast data sets, a smart algorithm learns to accomplish the task it is

21. DANIEL CASTRO, MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN & ELINE CHIVOT, CTR. FOR DATA
INNOVATION, WHO IS WINNING THE AI RACE: CHINA, THE EU, OR THE UNITED STATES 1 (Aug.
19, 2019), https://www2.datainnovation.org/2019-china-eu-us-ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/XY92-4RM4]
(“Many nations are racing to achieve a global innovation advantage in artificial intelligence (AI)
because they understand that AI is a foundational technology that can boost competitiveness,
increase productivity, protect national security, and help solve societal challenges.”).
22. Mihailis E. Diamantis, The Body Corporate, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 151–55
(2021).
23. Mihailis E. Diamantis, The Extended Corporate Mind: When Corporations Use AI To
Break the Law, 91 N.C. L. REV. 893, 910–11 (2020) [hereinafter Diamantis, The Extended
Corporate Mind].
24. KEVIN PETRASIC, BENJAMIN SAUL, JAMES GREIG, MATTHEW BORNFREUND &
KATHERINE LAMBERTH, WHITE & CASE, ALGORITHMS AND BIAS: WHAT LENDERS NEED TO
KNOW 1 (2017), https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/
algorithm-risk-thought-leadership.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ4Z-PPLM] (“[A] perfectly wellintentioned algorithm may inadvertently generate biased conclusions that discriminate against
protected classes of people.”); Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 729 (“[E]rrors may . . . be the
result of entirely innocent choices made by data miners.”).
25. See Ass’n for Computing Mach., ACM Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct § 1.2,
https://www.acm.org/code-of-ethics [https://perma.cc/2MTA-XDLS] (stating that computing
professionals have a duty to “avoid harm” stemming from their work).
26. Lemley & Casey, supra note 12, at 1335 (“[T]he unpredictability inherent in machine
learning is also one of its greatest strengths.”).
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given.27 Machine learning finds better ways to achieve goals than
human intelligence could anticipate or even understand.28 That is the
power of AI. The necessary correlate of unpredictable solutions is
unpredictable problems. If developers cannot foresee the ways
algorithms might injure us, they cannot always hardcode preventive
measures. The devil’s pact that we make with AI is that, by freeing it
from the constraints of low-level programming, it will both help and
harm in ways we cannot foresee.
The key to holding corporations accountable when their
algorithms hurt people is to recognize that the challenge of corporate
AI is a modern take on a very old problem—a problem the law solved
long ago. From a corporate compliance perspective, artificial and
organic intelligence are not so different. Both are crucial to corporate
productivity. Attempting to fully control either, even were that
possible, would entail unacceptable costs.29 Unpredictability can
enhance labor’s value because a workforce that obeys orders
mechanically and inflexibly will cause more harm than one that
interprets and adapts commands with a dose of common sense.
Consequently, both humans and advanced algorithms will end up
inflicting unexpected harm some of the time. But the inevitability of
harm does not mean that the law should stay its hand—doing so would
deny justice to victims and withhold efficient incentives from
corporations to exercise due care.30
Corporate law’s longstanding solution for the human workforce
was to recognize that corporations bear a special accountability
relationship for some of their workers.31 The hallmarks of that
relationship are the control corporations exercise and the benefit

27. See A Beginner’s Guide to Neural Networks and Deep Learning, PATHMIND: A.I. WIKI,
http://wiki.pathmind.com/neural-network [https://perma.cc/P59K-RJ45].
28. Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg,
David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 638 (2017)
(“[E]ven experts often struggle to understand what software code will do.”).
29. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 780–81 (1972).
30. Larry D. Thompson, The Blameless Corporation, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1251, 1255
(2010).
31. V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate
Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355, 369–70 (1999) (“[F]ederal courts use respondeat superior to
impute one agent’s acts and mens rea to the corporation.”).
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corporations derive.32 So long as workers act within the scope of that
relationship, corporations are accountable for the harms they cause.33
The central concept tying this legal scheme together is “employment.”
Over time, courts have doubled down on this general liability
framework to overcome abusive corporate efforts to avoid paying for
harms they cause.34 Decades before corporations started replacing
employees with algorithms, they turned to contract workers.35
Contractors do the same jobs as employees and receive a wage. Legally
speaking, though, contractors work for themselves or through an
agency.36 Through this formalistic sleight of hand, many corporations
hope to conjure some immunity from liability when their workers, now
contractors rather than employees, commit crimes and torts.37 Many
lawmakers have seen through the trick.38 They have responded by
emphasizing the functional characteristics of employment—benefit
and control—and determined that some contractors are more like
employees. Accordingly, corporations could be liable when those
contractors-cum-employees break the law.
This Article offers a structurally identical solution to address
algorithmic misconduct. Some algorithms and corporations bear a
special relationship to each other, also characterized by corporate
benefit and control. According to the “Labor Model” offered here, the
law should treat such algorithms as corporate employees for liability
purposes. Like contractors, these “employed algorithms” are not
paradigmatic employees. But employed algorithms do fit squarely

32. Mihailis E. Diamantis, Algorithms Acting Badly: A Solution from Corporate Law, 89
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 801, 832–33, 842–43 (2021) [hereinafter Diamantis, Algorithms Acting
Badly].
33. 27 AM. JUR. 2D Employment Relationship § 356 (2022).
34. See infra Parts II.C, III.C.
35. See generally Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining
Employment in the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673 (2016) (tracing the development of
corporations using contract workers).
36. Id. at 1682–87.
37. Heather Huston, Beware of Tort Exceptions to Limited Liability, WOLTERS KLUWER
(Jan. 24, 2022), https://www.wolterskluwer.com/en/expert-insights/beware-of-tort-exceptions-tolimited-liability [https://perma.cc/5LEQ-8XF9] (“An employer also may be able to avoid liability
for its agents or employees through the use of independent contractors.”).
38. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 35, 37 (Cal. 2018)
(adopting a standard that presumes all workers are employees instead of independent contractors
and shifts the burden on the entities to establish that independent contractor is the proper
classification for the individual, and noting that, in some circumstances, “the workers’ role within
the hiring entity’s usual business operations is more like that of an employee than that of an
independent contractor”).
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within the broader legal sense of “employ”: “to make use of”; “[t]o use
as . . . [a] substitute in transacting business”; and “[t]o . . . entrust with
the performance of certain acts or functions.”39 As the Supreme Court
has acknowledged, “The definition of ‘employ’ is broad.”40 By
recognizing that corporations employ algorithms, the Labor Model
could allow the law of corporate liability to keep pace with an evolving
and increasingly digital corporate workforce.
This Article is the culmination of a series of articles I have recently
published about corporate liability and algorithms. In them, I have
identified vicarious corporate liability as the only realistic way to
address the broader algorithmic accountability gap, which arises
because algorithms hurt people but are not cognizable defendants.41 I
have also developed models for attributing the statutory and common
law elements of liability—culpable mental states and harmful acts—to
corporations when corporate algorithms hurt people.42 Both of those
models emphasize the structural similarities between how corporations
(mis)use algorithms and how they (mis)use employees. This Article
draws those threads together to offer employed algorithms as a legal
innovation for packaging and implementing corporate responsibility
for algorithmic harms. In short, the Labor Model maintains that if a
corporation and an algorithm share the hallmarks of an employment
relationship—substantial benefit and substantial control—then the
algorithm should be deemed an employed algorithm for whose harms
the corporation could be liable.
One point bears emphasis early on because it will help avoid
potential confusion.43 Algorithms are not employees, nor should they
be regarded as such. Human employees have rights, responsibilities,
justified expectations, subjective points of view, rich life experiences,
and dignity interests that machines never will. Or so I believe.
However, the Labor Model does not turn on that assumption, nor on
its negation. One of the Labor Model’s key advantages is that it allows
39. Employ, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
40. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728 (1947).
41. Mihailis E. Diamantis, Vicarious Liability for AI, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF AI
AND LAW (Kristin Johnson & Carla Reyes eds., forthcoming 2023) (manuscript at 3) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Diamantis, Vicarious Liability for AI].
42. For further details on these models of liability, see generally Diamantis, The Extended
Corporate Mind, supra note 23 (offering a model for attributing mental states to corporations by
way of their algorithms) and Diamantis, Algorithms Acting Badly, supra note 32 (offering a model
for attributing algorithmic behavior to corporations).
43. I am grateful to Pauline Kim for emphasizing the importance of making this clarification
early on.
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us to remain agnostic on the deep philosophical question about the
moral status of smart silicon vis-à-vis smart carbon. The argumentative
framework below analogizes human employees and employed
algorithms only to the extent that both present similar productive
opportunities for corporations and similar compliance challenges. It is
a totally separate question, and one I am inclined to answer in the
negative, whether algorithms should be considered people in any richer
sense.
Part I begins with some necessary stage setting by clarifying
terminology and establishing an evaluative framework. Part II
describes three motivations for analogizing the compliance challenge
presented by algorithms to that presented by human employees: 1)
corporations use algorithms to perform employee functions, 2) the
justifications for holding corporations liable for employee misconduct
also apply to algorithmic misconduct, and 3) algorithms are relevantly
similar to contractors, whom courts sometimes already treat as
employees for liability purposes. These three threads motivate the
Labor Model offered in Part III. As Part IV demonstrates, the Labor
Model performs well on the evaluative framework advanced in Part I.
I. PRELIMINARIES
This Part provides detailed examples to illustrate how automated
systems help corporations avoid civil and criminal liability. The Part
then defines some key terms—like “autonomy” and “algorithm”—
before laying out a six-point framework for evaluating proposed
solutions to the problem. As argued in the final Section, the solutions
other scholars have offered perform poorly in light of that framework.
A. Too Many Hands, Too Few Hands, and the Problem of Corporate
Immunity
This section uses examples to illustrate how corporate immunity
arises. As explained above, the law of corporate liability relies on an
antiquated assumption about how corporations work: that they can
only act through individual human employees.44 Accordingly, plaintiffs
and prosecutors hoping for justice must find some employee whose
44. See W. Robert Thomas, Corporate Criminal Law Is Too Broad—Worse, It’s Too
Narrow, 51 ARIZ. ST. L. REV. 199, 234 (2021) (“[A] tight connection between organizational
responsibility and individual responsibility is precisely what respondeat superior requires of
corporate criminal law.” (citations omitted)); Mihailis E. Diamantis, Corporate Identity, in
EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF IDENTITY AND THE SELF 203, 205 (Kevin Tobia ed., 2022).
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deficient conduct somehow contributed to the algorithmic harm they
allege. Because algorithms serve as complex causal intermediaries
between what employees do and what victims experience, plaintiffs
and prosecutors can face two types of barriers.
The first barrier is the “Many Hands Problem.” Corporate
operations often occur at such a scale and complexity that they require
many employees to be involved. Automated corporate operations are
no exception. Distributed teams of hundreds or thousands of
employees design and run corporate algorithms.45 One bad actor can
turn a corporate function to harmful ends, whether on purpose (e.g.,
by bribing a public official) or through negligence (e.g., by failing to
run adequate quality control on manufactured products). A Many
Hands Problem is an evidentiary roadblock that arises when it is
difficult or impossible to prove that such an employee exists.46
Investigating and reconstructing the acts of the corporation that led to
a harm is notoriously difficult. Since the corporation will likely face
liability if a responsible employee is uncovered, it has little motivation
to cooperate.47 Individual employees, who also potentially face liability
for their own misconduct, have every incentive to point their fingers in
different directions and confound the narrative. The Many Hands
Problem partially explains why the Department of Justice consistently
fails to indict individuals within large corporate criminals.48 It also
explains why special tort doctrines—like the law of product liability—
sometimes dispense entirely with the requirement that plaintiffs find a

45. See Marta Infantino & Weiwei Wang, Algorithmic Torts: A Prospective Comparative
Overview, 28 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 309, 318 (2019).
46. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to all
Component Heads & U.S. Att’ys, Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing 2 (Sept.
9, 2015) [hereinafter Yates Memorandum], https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/
download [https://perma.cc/7J5F-2BTM] (“In large corporations, where responsibility can be
diffuse and decisions are made at various levels, it can be difficult to determine if someone
possessed the knowledge and criminal intent necessary to establish their guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.”); Amanda M. Rose & Richard Squire, Intraportfolio Litigation, 105 NW. U.
L. REV. 1679, 1684 (2011) (“In some situations it may be impossible for victims to discover or
prove which particular employees within a firm caused their injuries.”).
47. See Jennifer Arlen, The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 66 U. MIA.
L. REV. 321, 324 (2012) (“[C]orporate efforts to help the government could hurt the firm by
increasing its probability of being held criminally liable.”).
48. In response to this problem, the Department of Justice had to update its policies to force
prosecutors to pursue all leads against individuals before resolving a case against a corporation.
See Yates Memorandum, supra note 46 (“Department attorneys should not resolve matters with
a corporation without a clear plan to resolve related individual cases . . . .”).
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single responsible employee by allowing them to hold the entire
corporation directly liable.49
The second barrier plaintiffs and prosecutors can encounter is the
“No Hands Problem.” It arises because complex corporate operations
can sometimes go awry even if every employee behaves responsibly.50
Organizational scientists have long known that bad organizational
systems, rather than bad people within those systems, can sometimes
be the true problem.51 For example, a broken channel of
communication may prevent important information from flowing
between two well-intentioned employees.52 In one famous case, a bank
failed to file mandatory anti-money-laundering reports because the
system for letting compliance personnel know that a report-triggering
event had occurred was not operational.53 Corporate algorithms can
exacerbate the No Hands Problem. Technologists have shown that an
algorithm can misbehave even if everyone who programmed and
operated it behaved faultlessly.54 As discussed above and in more detail
below, today’s most advanced algorithms necessarily incorporate a
certain degree of unpredictability. Thus, when a No Hands Problem
arises, plaintiffs and prosecutors cannot find a culpable employee
because no such employee exists.
Several recent incidents show how the Many Hands Problem and
the No Hands Problem help corporations elude justice when their
algorithms cause harm. In some incidents, the stakes are extremely
high. In 2015, a robot at a car plant bypassed safety protocols, entered
an unauthorized area, and crushed employee Wanda Holbrook’s
head.55 In a vivid illustration of the Many Hands Problem, her husband
49. See, e.g., Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp., 424 P.3d 290, 298 (Cal. 2018) (“Strict products
liability, unlike negligence doctrine, focuses on the nature of the product, and not the nature of
the manufacturer’s conduct.”).
50. See Mihailis E. Diamantis, The Corporate Insanity Defense, 111 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 37–40, 56–58 (2021) [hereinafter Diamantis, The Corporate Insanity Defense]
(demonstrating how the normative significance of joint action can be very different from the
normative significance of every individual contribution to the joint action).
51. See Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate
Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L. REV. 468, 479 (1988)
(“Organisations are systems . . . not just aggregations of individuals.”).
52. See generally Mihailis E. Diamantis, Functional Corporate Knowledge, 61 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 319 (2019) [hereinafter Diamantis, Functional Corporate Knowledge] (discussing
corporate compliance and information systems).
53. United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844, 847, 855–56 (1st Cir. 1987).
54. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 729.
55. Conner Forrest, Robot Kills Worker on Assembly Line, Raising Concerns About HumanRobot Collaboration, TECHREPUBLIC (Mar. 15, 2017, 7:15 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com/
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struggled to find a suitable defendant. He initially sued five U.S.
robotics corporations—Prodomax, Flex-N-Gate, FANUC, Nachi, and
Lincoln Electric—for wrongful death.56 Each had a hand in installing,
integrating, engineering, servicing, controlling, and/or manufacturing
the robot and/or its safety devices.57 It proved very difficult for
Holbrook’s husband to make even a prima facie case that any of them,
let alone some employee within one of them, was responsible. The
court dismissed his suit as to four of the defendants.58 The case lingers
on today against the remaining defendant who is confident enough to
refuse settlement.59
A notorious example of the No Hands Problem arose in 2018,
when one of Uber’s self-driving cars struck and killed pedestrian
Elaine Herzberg as she was crossing the street.60 Prosecutors decided
not to press charges against Uber or any individual Uber employee.61
As one reporter noted, it is hard to answer “[w]ho killed Elaine
Herzberg.”62 A National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”)
investigation identified several defects in Uber’s algorithm, including
that it failed to categorize Herzberg as a pedestrian or apply maximum

article/robot-kills-worker-on-assembly-line-raising-concerns-about-human-robot-collaboration
[https://perma.cc/QC82-JP5A].
56. Harriet Agerholm, Robot ‘Goes Rogue and Kills Woman on Michigan Car Parts
Production Line,’ INDEPENDENT (Mar. 15, 2017, 11:37 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/americas/robot-killed-woman-wanda-holbrook-car-parts-factory-michigan-ventraionia-mains-federal-lawsuit-100-a7630591.html [https://perma.cc/V6R4-4CCS].
57. Complaint and Jury Demand at 3, Holbrook v. Prodomax Automation, Ltd., No. 17-cv00219 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 7, 2017).
58. Order Granting Defendant Nachi Robotic’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 3–4,
Holbrook, No. 17-cv-00219 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 26, 2019) (granting summary judgment to Nachi
Robotics because its machine was not involved in the accident); Stipulated Order of Dismissal of
Defendant, the Lincoln Electric Company, Without Prejudice at 1, Holbrook, No. 17-cv-00219
(W.D. Mich. July 24, 2020) (dismissing Lincoln Electric); Stipulated Order Dismissing Counts VI
and XI of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint with Prejudice at 2, Holbrook, No. 17-cv-00219
(W.D. Mich. Apr. 26, 2021) (dismissing the res ipsa loquitur and concert of action claims);
Stipulated Order of Dismissal at 1, Holbrook, No. 17-cv-00219 (W.D. Mich. June 18, 2021)
(dismissing FANUC).
59. As of this writing, one defendant remains in the litigation. See Holbrook v. Prodomax
Automation Ltd., No. 1:17-cv-219, 2021 WL 4260622, at *1, *8 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2021).
60. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona, Where Robots
Roam, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/uber-driver
less-fatality.html [https://perma.cc/RA9N-WHZB].
61. Ray Stern, Prosecutor: No Crime by Uber in Self-Driving Death; Crash Still Under
Scrutiny, PHX. NEW TIMES (Mar. 5, 2019, 3:45 PM), https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/
uber-committed-no-crime-self-driving-crash-tempe-prosecutor-11231539 [https://perma.cc/V6
B2-SNYK].
62. Schmitt, supra note 18.
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brake pressure.63 The NTSB also blasted Uber’s inadequate safety
culture.64 To date, no one has identified an individual at Uber who was
single-handedly responsible for any of it. The problem is that
“[a]utonomous vehicle design involves an almost incomprehensible
combination of engineering tasks including sensor fusion, path
planning, and predictive modeling of human behavior. But despite the
best efforts to consider all possible real-world outcomes, things can go
awry.”65
Adding insult to injury, prosecutors investigating Herzberg’s
death clearly felt pressure to take some action. So they filed charges
against Rafaela Vasquez, the backup driver in the car that hit
Herzberg.66 Since Vasquez is an independent contractor, not an Uber
employee, Uber must have been happy to throw her under the bus.67
Many critics see Vasquez—a forty-seven-year-old, Hispanic,
transgender woman—as a convenient scapegoat whom Uber used to
divert attention from itself.68 Vasquez’s case is an example of what
anthropologist Madeleine Claire Elish calls a “moral crumple
zone[].”69 Vasquez became a “largely totemic human[] whose central
role [was to] soak[] up fault, even if they had only partial control of the
system.”70
The prosecutor alleged that Vasquez—whose job was to sit by and
take control of the car if necessary—was not paying attention at the
63. NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/HAR - 19/03, COLLISION BETWEEN VEHICLE
CONTROLLED BY DEVELOPMENTAL AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEM AND PEDESTRIAN, TEMPE,
ARIZONA, MARCH 18, 2018, at 15 tbl., 40, 57–58 (2018) [hereinafter NTSB REPORT], https://
www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/HAR1903.pdf [https://perma.cc/9W6XH5XR].
64. See id. at 58.
65. Henry Grabar, Uber Crash in Arizona Kills Woman in First Pedestrian Death Caused by
a Self-Driving Car, SLATE (Mar. 19, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2020/10/uberself-driving-car-death-arizona-vs-vasquez.html [https://perma.cc/58EY-RJWR].
66. Ray Stern, Uber Backup Driver Indicted in 2018 Self-Driving Crash That Killed Woman,
PHX. NEW TIMES (Sept. 15, 2020, 2:50 PM), https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/uber-back
up-driver-in-phoenix-indicted-over-fatal-self-driving-car-crash-in-18-11494111 [https://perma.cc/
V39L-JAVV].
67. I discuss independent contractors extensively below, infra Part II.C.
68. Ray Stern, Trial Delayed for Backup Driver in Fatal Crash of Uber Autonomous Vehicle,
PHX. NEW TIMES (May 12, 2021) [hereinafter Stern, Trial Delayed], https://www.phoenixnew
times.com/news/uber-crash-arizona-vasquez-herzberg-trial-negligent-homicide-charge-11553424
[https://perma.cc/9EEQ-NUL7].
69. Madeleine Clare Elish, When Your Self-Driving Car Crashes, You Could Still Be the One
Who Gets Sued, QUARTZ (July 25, 2015), https://qz.com/461905/when-your-self-driving-car-cra
shes-you-could-still-be-the-one-who-gets-sued [https://perma.cc/TH2H-P9YA].
70. Id.
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time of the crash.71 Vasquez disputes this.72 Even if the prosecutor is
right, Vasquez seems herself to have been a victim of a welldocumented phenomenon called “automation-induced complacency,”
which psychologists identified nearly three decades ago.73 Human
beings, both expert and naive, naturally lose focus if they are
overseeing highly automated systems.74 The NTSB report pointed the
finger of blame at Uber because its cars had no “effective
countermeasures to control the risk of operator disengagement.”75
Examples of the Many Hands and No Hands Problems abound for
nonlethal harms too. Though there are often insufficient public facts
available to say for sure which of the two problems is at issue, the
practical consequence for plaintiffs and prosecutors is the same. One
of the best documented examples is algorithmic discrimination.76 In
these cases, algorithms make important decisions about employment
or credit using proxies for protected characteristics.77 Human
employees making similar decisions would clearly be breaking the
law.78 For example, a recruiting algorithm at Amazon demonstrated a
preference for male candidates79; crime prediction algorithms in
Chicago and New Orleans targeted Black neighborhoods80; and a
consumer credit algorithm at Apple disfavored women.81 One thing

71. Stern, Trial Delayed, supra note 68.
72. Id.
73. Raja Parasuraman, Robert Molloy & Indramani L. Singh, Performance Consequences
of Automation-Induced ‘Complacency,’ 3 INT’L J. AVIATION PSYCH. 1, 2 (1993).
74. Raja Parasuraman & Dietrich H. Manzey, Complacency and Bias in Human Use of
Automation: An Attentional Integration, 52 HUM. FACTORS 381, 382 (2010) (discussing study
indicating that highly experienced airline captains blamed complacency for accidents).
75. NTSB REPORT, supra note 63, at 44.
76. For an excellent discussion of the true harm of algorithmic discrimination, as well as a
provocative solution for mitigating it, see Deborah Hellman, Measuring Algorithmic Fairness, 106
VA. L. REV. 811, 834–42, 861–62 (2020).
77. See generally Anya E.R. Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of
Artificial Intelligence and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1257 (2020) (discussing the threat of proxy
discrimination in algorithmic decision-making).
78. See infra Part III.C.
79. Miranda Bogen, All the Ways Hiring Algorithms Can Introduce Bias, HARV. BUS. REV.
(May 6, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/05/all-the-ways-hiring-algorithms-can-introduce-bias [https://
perma.cc/R7KY-XSVZ].
80. Rashida Richardson, Jason M. Schultz & Kate Crawford, Dirty Data, Bad Predictions:
How Civil Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice, 94
N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 192, 208–14 (2019).
81. Liz O’Sullivan, How the Law Got It Wrong with Apple Card, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 14,
2021, 10:15 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2021/08/14/how-the-law-got-it-wrong-with-apple-card
[https://perma.cc/U7CU-NRUB].
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that unites these cases is that victims have trouble finding an employee
within the organization who had a discriminatory purpose—either
because there is no such employee or because he is hidden in the crowd.
Consequently, victims of algorithmic discrimination struggle to hold
organizations accountable, even though the harm they suffer is no
different than one they could suffer at the hands of human employees.82
Structurally similar challenges emerge when hedge funds’ trading
algorithms learn to manipulate stock83 or retailers’ price-setting
algorithms learn to collude.84 Though individual traders and consumers
experience harm as a result, corporate liability has been hard to come
by. 85
B. Some Key Concepts: Liability, Algorithm, and Autonomy
This Section clarifies some key concepts. As deployed here, each
concept has a core meaning, and the arguments that follow are most
forceful with respect to that core. Each concept also has multiple
peripheral meanings. The arguments often apply to them as well,
though perhaps with less force. With respect to the peripheral
meanings, the proposal developed below may sometimes be expedient
rather than strictly necessary for promoting corporate accountability.

82. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 726.
83. See generally Tom C.W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L.J. 1253 (2017)
(discussing the capacity of new financial technologies, such as stock trading algorithms, to
destabilize markets); Hilary J. Allen, The SEC as Financial Stability Regulator, 43 J. CORP. L. 715,
745 (2018) (“While humans are certainly involved in programming [high frequency trading]
algorithms, once the algorithm has been set, the trading is self-executing—there is no time to
apply human judgment to individual decisions about whether to trade or not.”).
84. Greg Rosalsky, When Algorithms Collude, NPR: PLANET MONEY (Apr. 2, 2019, 7:30
AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2019/04/02/708876202/when-computers-collude
[https://perma.cc/U957-ELY8]; Emilio Calvano, Giacomo Calzolari, Vincenzo Denicolò & Sergio
Pastorello, Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion, CTR. FOR ECON. POL’Y
RSCH.: VOXEU (Feb. 3, 2019), https://voxeu.org/article/artificial-intelligence-algorithmic-pricingand-collusion [https://perma.cc/B27T-ATQP]; Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial
Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Competition, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1775, 1782.
85. The exceptions have been cases where neither the Many Hands Problem nor the No
Hands Problem arose, for example, where identifiable employees purposely developed
algorithms that would collude on pricing. See, e.g., Andrew C. Finch, Former Principal Deputy
Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Keynote Address at Annual Conference on
International Antitrust Law and Policy (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
acting-assistant-attorney-general-andrew-finch-delivers-keynote-address-annual-conference
[https://perma.cc/4WTM-AT6D].
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1. Corporate Liability. The law considers corporations to be
“people.”86 In principle, plaintiffs and prosecutors can sue corporations
for any violation, civil or criminal.87 Formally speaking, the corporation
itself is the defendant in such cases.88 Employees and shareholders are
(and should be) separately liable for any violations they commit
personally, but they do not directly pay any judgment rendered against
the corporation.89
As used in this Article, the paradigmatic instance of “corporate
liability” is criminal liability for violations with a mens rea element of
purpose or knowledge. Criminal harm calls most compellingly for
accountability that can secure justice and prevention. When liability
turns on a demanding, subjective mental state like purpose or
knowledge, the Many Hands and No Hands Problems are more likely
to arise. These mens rea require plaintiffs to peer into an individual’s
head and to exclude alternative explanations for their behavior, like
ulterior motives and mistaken beliefs. Corporate liability also includes
civil liability and liability premised on objective mental states like
negligence. The arguments below apply to such liability too, though
they may be less urgent or needed less frequently. The arguments are
weakest with respect to strict liability civil violations, where fault
standards are most permissive and therefore most likely to encompass
algorithmic harms.
2. Algorithm. An “algorithm” is a “mathematical or logical
process consisting of a series of steps, designed to solve a specific type
of problem.”90 Technically speaking, a cake recipe counts as an
algorithm. However, for this Article, “algorithm” refers specifically to
computer software. It does not matter whether the algorithm runs on a
86. Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (defining “person” to “include corporations”); Int’l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[T]he corporate personality is a fiction, although a
fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact.”).
87. One exception is sexual offenses, though, as Professor Erin Sheley has persuasively
argued, this exception is a conceptual and policy mistake. Erin L. Sheley, Tort Answers to the
Problem of Corporate Criminal Mens Rea, 97 N.C. L. REV. 773, 777 (2019).
88. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909) (“[There is]
no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the corporation . . . shall be held
punishable by fine because of the knowledge and intent of its agents to whom it has [e]ntrusted
authority to act . . . .”).
89. See generally Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV.
949, 955–56 (2009) (“One of the great challenges for policymakers, then, is to craft rules and
regulations that force firms to internalize the long-term costs of their wrongdoing without
crowding out individual incentives to disclose information.”).
90. Algorithm, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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stationary system (like a desktop computer or smart phone) or a
physically mobile one (like a self-driving car). Both can harm other
people, though perhaps in different ways.
Computer algorithms exhibit a broad range of sophistication.
Some algorithms are static because they consist of series of pre-coded
steps that remain constant across inputs.91 The same inputs always
produce the same outputs: if the applicant’s salary is over $100,000,
current debt is $0, credit score is greater than 750, and house purchase
value is less than $400,000, then approve mortgage with 20 percent
down. Other, more powerful algorithms use what is known as
“machine learning” to find patterns in massive amounts of data and
then dynamically improve their code as they encounter new inputs.92
Programmers for a bank might use millions of historical mortgage
default records to preliminarily “train” a machine learning algorithm
to evaluate credit risk. Then, as the bank puts the algorithm to work in
approving mortgages, the algorithm evaluates its own performance and
improves.93 The resulting code might balance thousands of data points
for each mortgage in a web of contingencies that is too complex and
convoluted for any human intelligence to comprehend.94 Many people
think that “machine learning” is synonymous with “artificial
intelligence,” but technically, there is a difference. Even static systems
count as artificially intelligent if they seem “smart” enough.95
When this Article refers to “artificial intelligence,” it refers
specifically to machine learning artificial intelligence. The arguments
below have the greatest bite for the algorithms that are most likely to

91. Paul E. Black, Deterministic Algorithm, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. (Jan. 14,
2009), https://xlinux.nist.gov/dads/HTML/deterministicAlgorithm.html [https://perma.cc/XF8TDA85].
92. Karen Hao, What Is Machine Learning?, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 17, 2018), https://
www.technologyreview.com/2018/11/17/103781/what-is-machine-learning-we-drew-you-anotherflowchart [https://perma.cc/NJ74-WLMV]; Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of
Machines, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1285 (2018) (“[Machine learning algorithms] generate their own
computer models and (if well-constructed) improve automatically with experience—they learn.”).
93. See Eban Escott, What Are the 3 Types of AI? A Guide to Narrow, General, and Super
Artificial Intelligence, CODEBOTS (Oct. 24, 2017), https://codebots.com/artificial-intelligence/the3-types-of-ai-is-the-third-even-possible [https://perma.cc/QX9Q-PHUP].
94. See Cynthia Rudin & Joanna Radin, Why Are We Using Black Box Models in AI When
We Don’t Need To? A Lesson from an Explainable AI Competition, HARV. DATA SCI. REV. (Nov.
22, 2019), https://hdsr.mitpress.mit.edu/pub/f9kuryi8/release/8 [https://perma.cc/55N4-DPE9].
95. Bernard Marr, What Is the Difference Between Artificial Intelligence and Machine
Learning, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2016, 2:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/
12/06/what-is-the-difference-between-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning/?sh=49b62626
2742 [https://perma.cc/HP55-QQ22].
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give rise to the Many Hands and No Hands Problems, and these tend
to be machine learning algorithms. Traditional employee-focused
doctrines of corporate liability will more often suffice when harm
results from static algorithms because every line of code is more
directly connected to a human coder. Machine learning algorithms, by
contrast, program themselves. They are inscrutable. And they
incorporate some inherent arbitrariness in how they model data.96 All
three of these features mean that errors can arise in machine learning
algorithms—an innocent pedestrian struck or a mortgage improperly
declined—without any identifiable human who is responsible.
Accordingly, the core sense of “algorithm” throughout this Article
refers to machine learning algorithms, though the motivating concerns
and proposed solutions could also be helpful in some contexts
involving static algorithms.
3. Autonomy. An “autonomous” algorithm is one that makes
decisions on its own without continuous direction or intervention from
humans. Autonomous algorithms are becoming “the new normal”
because they often adopt better strategies than their human
counterparts.97 Autonomous algorithms manage retail stores, trade
stocks, drive cars, package boxes,98 and even serve as corporate board
members.99
There is no settled definition of algorithmic autonomy. Rather
than wander into the technological and philosophical weeds, this
Article adopts a functional characterization. On this understanding,
autonomy exists on a spectrum depending on how much human
intervention an algorithm requires. For purposes of this Article, an
algorithm is autonomous if it could raise a No Hands Problem. In other
words, if an algorithm could cause harm for which no human is morally
responsible, then it qualifies as autonomous. The more likely such a
situation is to arise, the more autonomous the algorithm is. A fully
96. Kroll et al., supra note 28, at 653.
97. Michael Schrage, 4 Models for Using AI To Make Decisions, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 27,
2017), https://hbr.org/2017/01/4-models-for-using-ai-to-make-decisions [https://perma.cc/DF3QN6FA].
98. Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Rolls Out Machines That Pack Orders and Replace Jobs,
REUTERS (May 13, 2019, 5:32 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-automationexclusive/exclusive-amazon-rolls-out-machines-that-pack-orders-and-replace-jobs-idUSKCN1SJ
0X1 [https://perma.cc/7LN8-3DVG].
99. See generally Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci, Artificial Agents in Corporate Boardrooms,
105 CORNELL L. REV. 869, 871 (2020) (“[A]rtificial intelligence and algorithms have somewhat
already made it into some corporate boardrooms around the world.”).
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autonomous algorithm is one that is just as likely as a human to cause
harm for which no other entity is morally responsible. The arguments
throughout this Article apply with greater force and urgency to more
autonomous algorithms.
C. A Six-Point Evaluative Framework
Corporations are a natural place to turn when algorithms hurt
people. The algorithms themselves are not cognizable defendants.100
Algorithms could not pay even if a court entered judgment against
them. Nor would threatening algorithms with sanctions change how
they behave; they do not have the interests and wants necessary for
deterrent incentives to take hold. Since corporations generally design,
own, and operate the world’s most impactful algorithms, there will
usually be at least one corporation that is associated (in a loose sense)
with algorithmic harm. So, the law could conceivably substitute
corporations as vicarious defendants when their algorithms cause
harm. Unlike algorithms, corporations are purpose-driven,
hierarchical organizations with pocketbooks. In other words, they are
the type of entities that make sense as defendants because they can give
satisfaction for victims and have incentives that liability can target in
its effort to improve future performance.
Just because the law could substitute corporations as defendants
in place of their algorithms, that does not necessarily mean doing so
would be a good idea. Corporations and algorithms are complex
entities that drive many of the social and economic systems on which
we rely. We must be sure to avoid potentially catastrophic
unanticipated consequences, such as an unduly hobbled or dangerously
emboldened technology sector.
To evaluate the advisability of corporate accountability for
algorithmic harm, I propose below six basic criteria against which any
model of corporate accountability should be measured: (1) identify
which corporation is liable, (2) foreclose opportunities for
gamesmanship, (3) provide efficient incentives, (4) generate fair
outcomes, (5) be easy to implement, and (6) promote programming

100. I have argued extensively elsewhere against any legal change that would recognize
algorithms as cognizable defendants. See Joanna J. Bryson, Mihailis E. Diamantis & Thomas D.
Grant, Of, for, and by the People: The Legal Lacuna of Synthetic Persons, 25 A.I. & L. 273, 275
(2017) (arguing against recognizing the legal personhood of artificial intelligence).
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values.101 Any model of vicarious corporate liability for algorithmic
harms that satisfies these criteria stands a good chance of improving
the status quo. We can also compare competing models by assessing
how well they perform across the criteria. I lay out the criteria below
and unpack some of the nuanced challenges this Article seeks to
overcome.
Criterion 1. Identify Which Corporation(s) Will Be Liable. There
are often many corporations behind the most important algorithms.102
One corporation may have designed a module for an algorithm that a
second assembled. A third corporation may have tested the algorithm.
A fourth may have marketed it to a fifth that owns and licenses it to a
sixth that operates it on hardware owned by a seventh. A harmful
defect could arise in an algorithm at any step or from interaction effects
between steps.103 Any approach for holding corporations accountable
for algorithmic harms must be able to say which of these corporations
should pay and why.
Criterion 2. Be Robust Enough to Avoid Gamesmanship. As a
corollary to the first criterion, whatever mechanism the model uses to
identify liable corporations should not be manipulable. Businesses are
masters at managing liability.104 If there is a liability loophole, they (or
their savvy attorneys) will find it.105 For example, if the rule is that
owners of harmful algorithms are liable, large corporations will simply
transfer formal ownership to underfunded shells, subsidiaries, or

101. The discussion in this section summarizes work from Diamantis, Vicarious Liability for
AI, supra note 41, at 3–12. More detailed discussion of the criteria is available there.
102. See Infantino & Wang, supra note 45, at 340–41 (noting that potential defendants in an
algorithmic tort range “from start-ups and stand-alone software developers, to governments,
state-owned enterprises, and research institutions, to producers, distributors, and users of
algorithmic products and services, to large corporations with worldwide branches”).
103. Id. at 353–54.
104. Douglas C. Michael, To Know a Veil, 26 J. CORP. L. 41, 55 (2000) (“[O]ne of the
corporation’s central purposes is the limitation of liability.”).
105. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law,
110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000) (arguing that the primary purpose of corporate law practice of asset
partitioning is “the shielding of the assets of the entity from claims of the creditors of the entity’s
owners or managers”); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1913–15 (1991) [hereinafter Hansmann &
Kraakman, Unlimited Shareholder Liability] (noting that a savvy corporate actor could use
financial restructuring in order to spread liability among many less resourced entities); Mark J.
Roe, Corporate Strategic Reactions to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1, 39–40 (1986) (listing
incorporation strategies an entity could use in order to minimize risk from mass tort judgments).
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partners, or perhaps even to the users of the algorithms, while ensuring
the benefits for the algorithms’ work continue to flow to them.106
Criterion 3. Give Efficient Incentives to All Parties Involved.
Corporate liability for algorithmic harms is an efficiency balancing act.
By imposing too little liability, the law presently fails to incentivize
corporations to take due care in developing and monitoring their
algorithms.107 By imposing liability too severely or too often, the law
could make many algorithms too expensive, thereby depressing
corporate investment and suppressing technological innovation.108 This
would be a net social loss. Some algorithms take lives, but they have
the capacity to save many more.109 Some may discriminate, but they
have the potential to make decisions more objective.110 Some may
manipulate markets, but they could also help markets operate more
efficiently.111

106. Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 393 (2003) (“Firms may
externalize liability costs by spinning off risky operations into undercapitalized subsidiaries, as
when owners of taxi enterprises incorporate each cab separately.”); Hansmann & Kraakman,
Unlimited Shareholder Liability, supra note 105, at 1913–15; Roe, supra note 105.
107. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 106–07 (Harv. Univ. Press 2009)
(1881) (“[T]he safest way to secure care is to throw the risk upon the person who decides what
precautions shall be taken.”).
108. Rebecca Crootof, The Internet of Torts: Expanding Civil Liability Standards To Address
Corporate Remote Interference, 69 DUKE L.J. 583, 663 (2019) (noting that “[i]ncreasing corporate
liability may chill innovation” and calling on the legislature to weigh the costs and benefits of
expanding liability for internet-based torts).
109. See, e.g., Bernard Marr, AI That Saves Lives: The Chatbot That Can Detect a Heart
Attack Using Machine Learning, FORBES (Dec. 21, 2018, 12:23 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/bernardmarr/2018/12/21/ai-that-saves-lives-the-chatbot-that-can-detect-a-heart-attackusing-machine-learning [https://perma.cc/24CW-LMBL] (describing an AI tool that uses speech
recognition to identify whether an emergency call concerns a cardiac arrest).
110. See Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857,
865 (2017) (“Proponents of workforce analytics argue that data models can avoid reliance on
biased human decision-making . . . . [E]mployers and researchers can [also] use data to diagnose
where and how cognitive or structural biases are currently operating in ways harmful to
disadvantaged groups.”); Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV.
519, 533–37 (2018) (describing the potential for algorithmic discrimination and identifying
proposals to improve these algorithms).
111. See ONNIG H. DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE: INFORMATION LAW AND POLICY
IN CAPITAL MARKETS 16, 166 (2015) (describing how automated systems increase the liquidity
of data and information flows in securities trading); Terrence Hendershott, Charles M. Jones &
Albert J. Menkveld, Does Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity, 91 J. FIN. 1, 3 (2011) (“We find
that [algorithmic trading] does in fact improve liquidity for large-cap stocks.”).
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Victims’ incentives matter for efficiency too.112 They are the
mirror image of corporate incentives. Too much liability for
corporations could incentivize carelessness in people who interact with
algorithms, and too little corporate liability could incentivize undue
wariness.113 Both are suboptimal from a social welfare standpoint. If
potential victims know that they have some skin in the game too—for
example, if they are contributorily negligent—they will take care to
avoid unnecessary injury.
Criterion 4. Produce Fair Outcomes. Justice is also a balancing
act. Corporate liability should extend far enough to be fair to victims
without doing so much that it is unfair to corporations. The march of
digital progress will generate massive social benefits, as well as many
unanticipated social costs when things go wrong.114 Continuing to leave
victims to bear the costs of algorithmic harms would clearly tip the
scales of justice far beyond equipoise. Perhaps less intuitive is the fact
that it would be equally unacceptable from a fairness perspective to
force defendants, even for-profit corporations, to pay for every
algorithmic harm. Costs to faceless business entities are often too easy
to discount. However, those costs impose far-reaching effects on the
livelihoods of innocent flesh-and-blood individuals who do have an
indisputable claim to a fair outcome.115 These individuals include
shareholders and employees who stand just behind the corporation and
bear the brunt of any corporate sanction.116 Just one step further, there
are the many other corporate stakeholders—creditors, consumers,
community members, etc.—who can be impacted.117

112. Richard A. Posner & William M. Landes, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law,
15 GA. L. REV. 851, 868–70 (1980) (discussing the efficiency of the tort system in terms of inputs
of care from both the victim and the injurer).
113. See id. at 883–916 (discussing different forms of tort liability in terms of the incentives
for victims and injurers).
114. Only just over one-third of technologists think that “the net overall effect of algorithms
[will] be positive for individuals and society.” Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, Code-Dependent:
Pros and Cons of the Algorithm Age, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.pew
research.org/internet/2017/02/08/code-dependent-pros-and-cons-of-the-algorithm-age [https://
perma.cc/5HY6-5TML].
115. John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1339 (2009).
116. See Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways To Think About the Punishment of Corporations,
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1366–67 (2009).
117. Id. at 1367 (“[C]reditors, customers, and communities sometimes feel the pinch [of
corporate liability] too.”); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 278 (1999) (“[A] public corporation is a team of people who
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Criterion 5. Have Low Barriers to Implementation. The more
disruptive a proposed legal reform is, the lower its prospects for
implementation. Lobbying by adversely affected parties is one
potential source of trouble, and greater deviations from the status quo
are apt to galvanize more opposition.118 By contrast, broad support
builds more reliably for incremental changes and reforms that draw on
preexisting
legal
frameworks.119
Familiarity
can
smooth
implementation by lawmakers.120 Political economy matters if there is
to be any real hope for change.
Criterion 6. Promote Programming Values. Philosophers, political
scientists, and sociologists have been sounding alarm bells over how
algorithms can and do infringe human dignity, undermine democracy,
and perpetuate socioeconomic disparities.121 Technoethicists propose
several programming values—like respecting human autonomy,
ensuring human oversight, avoiding deception, and preserving user
privacy—to guide programmers in developing socially responsible
algorithms.122 Falling short of these values would not always violate the
law, but it would be a missed opportunity not to use corporate liability
to foster them.
One salient programming value is transparency.123 According to it,
decisions impacting human interests should have an accessible and
comprehensible justifying logic.124 An algorithm that is not transparent
is called a “black box” algorithm.125 Transparency is central to human
enter into a complex agreement to work together for their mutual gain. Participants—including
shareholders, employees, and perhaps other stakeholders such as creditors or the local
community—enter into a ‘pactum subjectionis.’”).
118. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN.
L. REV. 191 (2012) (discussing the impact of interest group lobbying); Todd Zywicki, RentSeeking, Crony Capitalism, and the Crony Constitution, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 77 (2015)
(discussing the economics of rent-seeking through lobbying).
119. Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Problem with Incrementalism, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
815, 816–17 (2010).
120. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 3–4 (1982).
121. See Spyros Makridakis, The Forthcoming Artificial Intelligence (AI) Revolution: Its
Impact on Society and Firms, 90 FUTURES 46, 50–52 (2017).
122. HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GRP. ON A.I., EUROPEAN COMM’N, ETHICS GUIDELINES FOR
TRUSTWORTHY AI 2–3, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/ethics-guidelines-trust
worthy-ai [https://perma.cc/58DQ-2YNP].
123. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1249 (2008) (arguing the importance of algorithmic transparency).
124. See generally Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265
(2020) (arguing that the law of access could help promote algorithmic transparency).
125. See Rudin & Radin, supra note 94.
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dignity interests vis-à-vis algorithms because people deserve to know
what decisions affect them and why those decisions were made.126 This
allows people to ensure that the decisions were principled, rather than
based on inaccurate information or influenced by prejudice.
*

*

*

While these six criteria should guide the search for a model of
corporate liability for algorithmic harm, they alone will not always say
which of two similar models is preferable. Multifactor tests are
notorious for producing different outcomes depending on how one
weighs individual, conflicting factors.127 This is especially true when, as
with the criteria above, the factors are comparative rather than
binary.128 For example, while Criterion 3 says the model should be
efficient, it does not make sense to assess whether a mechanism is
efficient or inefficient in itself; models can only be more or less efficient
when compared to some benchmark or to each other.
Ideally, we could move beyond a multifactor balancing test and
use a fully determinate test for comparing models. However, that
would require much more precise criteria and formulas for combining
them into a single numerical value, which is not a feasible option (at
least not for this Article). Fortunately, a fully determinate test is
unnecessary for present purposes. Part III demonstrates that the Labor
Model would be the unambiguous frontrunner among available models
on any approach to weighing the criteria. Only the Labor Model
satisfies all six.

126. This type of dignity-affirming transparency goes beyond what audits checking for
algorithmic discrimination can provide. See Kroll et al., supra note 28, at 660–62 (discussing the
advantages and limitations of auditing algorithms). At the same time, it is also important to
acknowledge that “[t]echnical tools alone cannot reliably prevent discriminatory outcomes
because the causes of bias often lie not in the code, but in broader social processes.” Pauline T.
Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189, 191 (2017).
127. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench:
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 41 (2007) (“Although multifactor tests are
ubiquitous, they are imperfect . . . . [M]ultifactor or balancing tests may be indeterminate, and
applying or weighing some of the factors within the test may require intuition.”).
128. See Gaines Pet Foods Corp. v. Martin Bros. Int’l, 692 F. Supp. 912, 915 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(“Factors can be assigned ‘weights’ to reach any result; . . . every case can be distinguished from
every other case, and the distinction can justify a different balance, and hence a different result.”).
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II. MOTIVATING THE EMPLOYMENT ANALOGY
More than a decade ago, technoethicist Joanna Bryson offered
what today stands as one of the only serious analogies between
algorithms and labor. She argued that “[r]obots should be slaves.”129
Her proposal is not metaphorical or flippant. She sees deep social,
political, and moral peril looming in the psychological tendency that
many people have, and that many technologists encourage, to
anthropomorphize robots. Individuals and institutions who view robots
as people will misdirect resources to them, even when those resources
could benefit human beings. More relevant to the concerns of this
Article, Bryson also believes that anthropomorphizing robots can
obscure who ultimately is responsible for bad outcomes. While it is
hard to blame an inanimate tool like a hammer, it is far more natural
to try to scapegoat an algorithm that seems more like an independently
responsible entity. Bryson’s recommended antidote: “[R]obots should
be built, marketed and considered legally as slaves.”130 Categorizing
robots as slaves would, she believes, firmly cement their status in our
psyche as subhuman artifacts.131
Bryson proposes slavery because her goal is to counteract any
tendency we might have to anthropomorphize algorithms. However,
there are moral, technological, and pragmatic reasons to reject
Bryson’s slavery analogy. To begin: slavery in all its forms is moral
anathema. As she says, there is no real ethical problem with
subjugating mere artifacts. But slavery has unacceptable associations
and implications, particularly when its justification is to restrict the
category of persons of moral concern.132 That is why the Thirteenth
Amendment categorically banishes non-punitive “slavery” simpliciter,

129. Joanna J. Bryson, Robots Should Be Slaves, in CLOSE ENGAGEMENTS WITH ARTIFICIAL
COMPANIONS: KEY SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, ETHICAL, AND DESIGN ISSUES 63, 63 (Yorick
Wilks ed., 2010).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 64.
132. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (enslaved party) (“[African
Americans] had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and
altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far
inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect . . . .”), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Girardeau A. Spann, Disparate Impact, 98
GEO. L.J. 1133, 1162 (2010) (“Historically, the things that we have done to each other in the name
of race always seemed legitimate to the white majority at the time that they were being done. . . .
Slavery was legitimate because white supremacy made slaves subhuman.”).
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without any qualifications depending on the subject of servitude.133 We
should explore every other option before reviving that institution as a
working legal and social category. Another concern is that Bryson’s
proposal would undermine algorithms’ most important benefits. As
explained at the start of this Article, Asimov’s Second Law of
Robotics—that robots should follow human orders—is not what we
want of today’s most advanced algorithms. The power of machine
learning algorithms is precisely that they do not work slavishly.134 Their
creative capacity to learn allows them to outperform any series of
commands a human could offer.135 Lastly, there is a risk that treating
robots as slaves would backfire. Bryson’s objective is to prevent us
from anthropomorphizing robots. But psychologists have found that
abusing robots is one powerful way to provoke empathetic responses
from human subjects.136 So treating algorithms like slaves could stir a
deeper impulse to see them as people.
Nevertheless, this Part explores one implication of Bryson’s
proposal. If we view robots as slaves, then we also conceive of them as
a type of labor. Clearly, algorithms have productive capacities. We
design them for precisely that purpose: to do things for us that we
cannot or would rather not. This Part asks: What type of labor
do/should algorithms best resemble?
A different labor analogy is available for the use corporations
make of algorithms: employment. Abstracting away from the legal
particularities of labor law, employment broadly refers to making use

133. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States.”).
134. See Shlomit Yanisky Ravid & Xiaoqiong (Jackie) Liu, When Artificial Intelligence
Systems Produce Inventions: An Alternative Model for Patent Law at the 3A Era, 39 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2215, 2220 (2018) (“AI advanced systems are becoming capable of creating unpredictable,
innovative outcomes independently, rather than merely by following digital orders.”).
135. See Jo De Boeck, Are AI Systems About To Outperform Humans?, FORBES (Oct. 3,
2019, 8:40 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/10/03/are-ai-systems-aboutto-outperform-humans [https://perma.cc/83K2-JKBC].
136. See generally KATE DARLING, THE NEW BREED: HOW TO THINK ABOUT ROBOTS 203–
88 (2021) (describing human reactions to violence directed at robots); Kate Darling, Palash Nandy
& Cynthia Breazeal, Emphatic Concern and the Effect of Stories in Human-Robot Interaction,
PROC. IEEE INT’L WORKSHOP ON ROBOT & HUM. COMMC’N (2015) (finding that empathic
participants were more likely to hesitate before striking a robot that had been given a humanizing
story); Charles Q. Choi, Brain Scans Show Humans Feel for Robots, IEEE SPECTRUM (Apr. 24,
2013), https://spectrum.ieee.org/brain-scans-show-humans-feel-for-robots [https://perma.cc/LS
K6-5X6T].
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of something.137 Nothing in the broad concept of employment limits the
employment relationship to human beings. Unlike “slavery,” which
entails “ha[ving] absolute power over the life, fortune, and liberty of
another,”138 “employment” connotes a constructive relationship. It
better captures the creative cooperation that exists between
corporations and algorithms while avoiding the moral and
psychological pitfalls of the slavery analogy.
The three sections that follow offer further motivations for
thinking of the relationship between corporations and their algorithms
as a type of employment.
A. Fungibility of Employee and Algorithmic Labor
The most straightforward reason for thinking that corporations
employ algorithms is the modern history of how corporations use them.
Corporations self-consciously replace human employees with
algorithms that perform identical functions. Algorithms now evaluate
credit card applications, trade stocks, package boxes—all jobs that only
human employees had not long ago. Algorithms may not count as
“employees” in the labor law sense of the term—they are not under
contract, and they need no wage or benefits.139 But if corporations
employ human beings, it stands to reason that corporations employ the
algorithms that fulfill the exact same functions as human beings.
Pretending that corporations only employ humans and not
algorithms opens the door to a destructive form of corporate
gamesmanship. Corporations have many legitimate reasons for using
algorithms. Well-designed algorithms often perform tasks more
efficiently140 and accurately141 than their human counterparts. When
corporations use such algorithms, society benefits overall. But not

137. Employ, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2014).
138. Slavery, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
139. Employee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Someone who works in the
service of another person (the employer) under an express or implied contract of hire, under
which the employer has the right to control the details of work performance.”).
140. See Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA
L. REV. 54, 65 (2019) (“Algorithms hold tremendous value. Big data promises significant benefits
to the economy, allowing consumers to find and sort products more quickly, which in turn lowers
search costs.”).
141. See Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of
Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 23 (2018); Jason Kreag, Prosecutorial Analytics, 94 WASH. U.
L. REV. 771, 773–74 (2017); Chris Anderson, The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the
Scientific Method Obsolete, WIRED (June 23, 2008, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2008/06/pbtheory [https://perma.cc/Q5QJ-EH42].
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every corporate motivation for using algorithms is so laudable.
Corporations also use algorithms to avoid accountability when things
go wrong.142 Under the general doctrine of corporate liability,
corporations are only liable for harms that arise through
employment.143 If employment relationships only extend to human
beings, corporations can reduce their liability risk by using algorithms
instead.
This sort of immunity for algorithmic harms benefits corporations,
but it reduces net social welfare and harms individuals in and out of the
corporation. When corporations limit their liability but not the
harmfulness of their conduct, they externalize some of the true costs of
their operation. As every economist would predict, this means
corporations will use algorithms even when, from a net social welfare
standpoint, it would be best if they refrained.144 In real-world terms,
corporations will (and do) roll out algorithms prematurely, before risks
of harm to others have been responsibly minimized.145 They might, for
example, use the streets of Phoenix as a proving ground for their selfdriving cars.146 By swapping to an algorithm, corporations can remove
a potential liability—a human employee for whose misconduct the

142. Microsoft President and Chief Legal Officer Brad Smith has remarked, “We don’t want
to see a commercial race to the bottom. Law is needed.” Cade Metz, Is Ethical A.I. Even
Possible?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/01/business/ethics-artif
icial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/DL9P-N27J]; see also Frank Pasquale, Toward a Fourth
Law of Robotics: Preserving Attribution, Responsibility, and Explainability in an Algorithmic
Society, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1243, 1244–45 (2017) (describing North Carolina’s attempt to prohibit
legal software manufacturers from attaining a lower standard of liability than attorneys, and the
Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice’s criticism of North Carolina’s decision).
143. Product liability is a common exception to this general rule. Manufacturers are strictly
liable when their defective products harm consumers. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965) (noting that strict products liability applies even though “the seller
has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product”). As I have stated
elsewhere, product liability will not apply to most algorithmic harms. Diamantis, Algorithms
Acting Badly, supra note 32, at 823–26. Some courts, like the one deciding Wanda Holbrook’s
wrongful death case, have held that algorithms can qualify as products, even when they are not
for general commercial distribution. Holbrook v. Prodomax Automation Ltd., No. 1:17-cv-219,
2021 WL 4260622, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2021). It bears noting, though, that such decisions
are the exception. Id. at *6–*7 (discussing the conflict between applicable state law and the
general rules reflected in the Restatement of Torts).
144. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 184–86 (4th ed. 1938).
145. See, e.g., Kate Conger, Uber’s Driverless Cars Return to the Road After Fatal Crash, N.Y
TIMES (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/technology/uber-driverless-carsreturn.html [https://perma.cc/FW22-PT7Q] (noting that Uber’s cars were still failing ten out of
seventy safety tests as it got close to returning the cars to the road).
146. Uber Self-Driving Cars Are Being Tested in Arizona, TECH. AZ (Oct. 14, 2019), https://
techaz.org/uber-self-driving-cars-arizona [https://perma.cc/4LGM-6N5V].
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corporation might have to pay. Algorithms either obscure liability or
fail as a matter of law to transmit liability when they mess up. This
algorithmic accountability gap mitigates the downside risk to
corporations of the rush to automate—“Move fast and break things.”147
But using algorithms in this way is socially suboptimal. Hasty
automation is bad for human employees because it unnecessarily
accelerates their redundancy. And it is bad for victims of corporations
because they are more likely to be left footing the bill for injuries that
algorithms cause.
Corporations take advantage of this liability loophole and
increasingly will as algorithms open new productive opportunities.148
Human employees, victims of corporate harm, and society deserve
better. The way to plug the liability loophole is to modernize the law
of corporate liability for the coming age of automation. Corporations
use human employees and algorithms for the same sorts of productive
tasks. This should translate into parity between employees and
algorithms when deciding the harm for which corporations must pay.
B. Overlapping Enforcement Landscape
From a corporate enforcement perspective, there are important
structural similarities between human employees and algorithms that
motivate abandoning any deep discontinuity in how corporate liability
works with respect to them. The general law of corporate liability
presently only holds corporations responsible for the misconduct of
human employees.149 Corporate doctrine responds to a familiar set of

147. This is Facebook’s unofficial motto and a rallying cry for much of Silicon Valley. David
Kushner, Facebook Philosophy: Move Fast and Break Things, IEEE SPECTRUM (June 1, 2011),
https://spectrum.ieee.org/facebook-philosophy-move-fast-and-break-things [https://perma.cc/
H4NK-GCWY].
148. See Tom Barratt, Alex Veen & Caleb Goods, How Algorithms Keep Workers in the
Dark, BBC (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20200826-how-algorithmskeep-workers-in-the-dark [https://perma.cc/65KM-HJGC] (“[I]t is almost impossible to complain
about the decisions of the algorithm.”); Sylvia Lu, Algorithmic Opacity, Private Accountability,
and Corporate Social Disclosure in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 23 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
99, 102 (2020) (“Algorithms are becoming a primary source of decision-making power, but are
often privately owned and inscrutable, which allows them to hide from legal regimes and prevents
regulators from understanding and reviewing them.”); Madeleine Clare Elish, Moral Crumple
Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot Interaction, 5 ENGAGING SCI. TECH. & SOC’Y 40, 42
(2019) (“[A]ccountability appears to be deflected off of the automated parts of the system (and
the humans whose control is mediated through this automation) and focused on the immediate
human operators, who possess only limited knowledge, capacity, or control.”).
149. See generally Thomas, supra note 44 (discussing the limitations of respondeat superior
as applied to algorithmic decision-making).
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enforcement challenges that employee misconduct creates. But
algorithmic misconduct raises the same challenges. Similar problems
call for similar solutions.
One goal of holding corporations accountable for employee
misconduct is justice for victims. When a corporate employee harms
someone, the most direct cause of action would ordinarily lie against
the individual employee.150 However, pursuing individual employees is
a very uncertain route to securing justice for victims or preventing
future harm. For one thing, individual employees are often judgmentproof. This means they lack adequate resources to compensate victims
for the wrongs they suffered,151 and financial penalties are unlikely to
provide much of an incentive.152 Even if liability could motivate
employees, they are often not in the best position to prevent future
corporate harms because they are not the true causal course behind the
harm.153 Environmental factors beyond an individual’s control critically
shape how employees behave.154 A criminogenic business culture,
inadequate training, and unrealistic performance quotas all increase
the chances that otherwise upstanding employees will break the law.155

150. See United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 407 (1962) (holding that a corporate employee
who broke the law is liable in his personal capacity even though he acted as a corporate agent).
151. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1477, 1496 n.104 (1996) (“[A]lternatives to corporate liability, such as individual criminal
liability for the agent, would also overcome the problem of judgment-proof agents.”).
152. See Rose & Squire, supra note 46, at 1683–84 (“[S]ince many employees are judgment
proof, holding employers liable for employee conduct enhances deterrence by encouraging the
employers to take measures that limit the costs their employees impose on third parties.”).
153. See Eli Lederman, Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation
and Imitation Toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity, 64 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 641,
688 (2000) (“[P]ersonnel changes will seldom lead to real changes in the organization’s behavior
and work processes.”); see also M. David Ermann & Richard J. Lundman, Corporate and
Governmental Deviance: Origins, Patterns, and Reactions, in CORPORATE AND GOVERNMENTAL
DEVIANCE: PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 3, 15–
16 (M. David Ermann & Richard J. Lundman eds., 5th ed. 1996) (noting that while the U.S.
intelligence community and cabinet members opposed Japanese internment in World War II,
their opinions did not affect the president’s decision).
154. See JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 427 (1990); FIONA
HAINES, CORPORATE REGULATION 25 (1997) (“Organizational culture forms the ‘touchstone’
by which individuals behave and act.”).
155. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1099–1101 (1991) (discussing how corporate ethos can
“encourage” employee behavior); Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Causes of
Corporate Crime: An Economic Perspective, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM 11, 17
(Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011) (“Instead of focusing on individual actions,
we can consider crime as the outcome of company-level decisions.”); Martin L. Needleman &
Carolyn Needleman, Organizational Crime: Two Models of Criminogenesis, 20 SOC. Q. 517, 520–
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True prevention would require addressing those. Corporate liability
can be the legal cure to both problems. The deeper pockets of
corporate employers are better suited to paying victims their full due.156
And corporations are better positioned to change the organizational
features that can induce individual employees to misbehave.157
The same concerns arise when there is no reliable pathway from
algorithmic harms to corporate liability. While employees are
practically judgment proof because they have shallow pockets,
algorithms are not even cognizable defendants.158 Victims of
algorithmic misconduct often have no legal recourse at all. This can
also mean that there is no direct way for victims and prosecutors to
induce algorithms to behave. Once again, corporate liability provides
a solution: a path to justice for victims and a defendant with the power
to effectuate change.
Even after deciding that corporations should be liable for
employee and algorithmic misconduct, overlapping justice and
preventive challenges arise. At the heart of the justice challenge for
employee misconduct is the fact that corporate liability is vicarious—
an employee misbehaves and a different person, the corporate
employer, has to pay.159 While vicarious liability is a familiar part of
both civil and criminal law, it is fraught with potential ethical pitfalls.160

22 (1979) (introducing and exploring the concept of crime-facilitative corporate systems in which
participants are not compelled to perform illegal acts, but rather face extremely tempting
structural conditions that encourage or facilitate crime).
156. Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to
Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605, 636 (1995)
(“Prosecuting the corporate entity can allocate responsibility to a party able to be penalized or
pay compensation, even where an individual wrongdoer cannot be identified.”).
157. See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Clockwork Corporations: A Character Theory of Corporate
Punishment, 103 IOWA L. REV. 507, 565–68 (2018); Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman,
Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 687, 702 (1997) (“Firms can structure their compensation and promotion policies to
encourage or discourage many forms of misconduct.”).
158. Thomas Beardsworth & Nishant Kumar, Who To Sue When a Robot Loses Your
Fortune, BLOOMBERG (May 5, 2019, 8:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201905-06/who-to-sue-when-a-robot-loses-your-fortune [https://perma.cc/42QB-3KGY] (“Robots are
getting more humanoid every day, but they still can’t be sued.”).
159. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 195 (1991)
(“[C]orporate criminal liability (at least as recognized in the United States) is a species of
vicarious criminal liability; that is, the principal is held liable for the acts of its agent—even when
the principal makes a substantial good faith attempt to monitor the agent and prevent the
illegality.”).
160. Alschuler, supra note 116.
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As a general rule, sanctioning one party for another’s misconduct
violates the moral principle that fault is personal.161 Vicarious liability
can be justified, but only in limited circumstances and by special
considerations. For example, parents may be vicariously liable for the
torts of their minor children because of the unique role parents have in
shaping their children and the social unity of the family structure.162
The law takes on a similar justificatory burden when it holds
corporations vicariously liable for employee misconduct.
The basic preventive challenge to holding corporations liable for
employee misconduct is that corporations are not in full control of what
employees do. The familiar economic phenomenon of agency costs
means that corporations can never perfectly monitor or direct
employee behavior.163 From an enforcement perspective, this means
that no compliance program can ever be perfect.164 There will always
be some space for employees to exercise undetected discretion. In that
space, economically rational employees will act in their personal
interest,165 sometimes even if that means breaking the law.166 Since
corporations cannot always control what employees do, they cannot

161. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224–25 (1961) (“In our jurisprudence guilt is
personal . . . .”); DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, 2 THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 425 (2d ed. 2011) (“[Vicarious liability] is an important exception to the usual rule that each
person is accountable for his own legal fault but in the absence of such fault is not responsible for
the actions of others.”); Shawn Bayern, Three Problems (and Two Solutions) in the Law of
Partnership Formation, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 605, 622–23 (2016) (“To the contrary, in the
usual case, parties are not legally responsible for the actions of others; it requires an exceptional
doctrine . . . to cause one party to be liable for another’s actions.”).
162. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (AM. L. INST. 1965) (“[The father] is
responsible for [his children’s] conduct in so far as he has the ability to control it. This duty is not
peculiar to a father. It extends to the mother also in so far as her position as mother gives her an
ability to control her child.”).
163. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 29, at 780; Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305, 313 (1976).
164. Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1430 (2009) (“No compliance program is perfect . . . .”).
165. Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and
Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 775 (2017) (“[Employees have a] natural incentive to
advance their personal interests even when those interests conflict with the goal of maximizing
their firm’s value.”).
166. See generally Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, Why Do Corporations Become
Criminals? Ownership, Hidden Actions, and Crime as an Agency Cost, 5 J. CORP. FIN. 1 (1999)
(discussing corporate crime as an agency cost).
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guarantee that employees will always obey the law. No legal threat can
overcome that economic conundrum.167
Structurally similar justice and preventive challenges would arise
if corporations were held liable for algorithmic harms, especially where
autonomous, machine learning algorithms are concerned. Since such
algorithms can behave “on their own” in unexpected ways, they can
resemble independent entities rather than mere tools of production.168
If that is right, policymakers would owe corporations a solid rationale
to overcome the prima facie injustice of vicarious liability.
Furthermore, since there is some measure of unpredictability inherent
in advanced algorithms, nothing corporations can do could ever
guarantee that their algorithms will not hurt anyone.169 So, the law
would need to explain how corporate liability can help prevent
algorithmic harm.
The overlapping corporate enforcement landscape—goals and
challenges—for employees and algorithms strengthens the case for
treating the two similarly in the law. The next Part lays out how the law
currently achieves its enforcement goals and meets the challenges of
holding corporations accountable for what individual employees do.
As argued below, the same strategies could meet the enforcement
challenges for algorithms. First, though, the next Section offers a brief
history of how corporations have exploited a formalistic understanding
of employment to shield themselves from liability.
C. The Precedent of Contract Workers
The strategy of shifting functions away from employees to avoid
liability is an old page out of a longstanding corporate playbook. While
corporations have always needed labor, they have also always been
adept at finding advantageous ways to reclassify the sort of labor they
have. By manipulating the line between who counts as an employee,
corporations have managed to avoid responsibility to and for their

167. Irwin Schwartz, Toward Improving the Law and Policy of Corporate Criminal Liability
and Sanctions, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 99, 112 (2014) (“No organization—private or government—
can prevent all misconduct by all employees, all of the time.”).
168. Ravid & Liu, supra note 134, at 2225 (“[Autonomy] is one of the most important
[features] to understand in order to grasp AI systems in general and their departure from the
framework of current patent law.”).
169. Anat Lior, The AI Accident Network: Artificial Intelligence Liability Meets Network
Theory, 95 TUL. L. REV. 1103, 1108 (2021) (“Much of the legal discussion surrounding AI entities
derives from our basic fear as a society to be susceptible to injuries and damages from these
unpredictable entities.”).
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workers. As detailed in this Section, there has been a long-standing
push and pull between corporations and legal reformers over which
people count as employees: temp workers, contract workers, gig
workers. In the modern retelling of this story, corporations draw
increasingly on automated systems and thereby re-create familiar
problems of using nonemployee labor.
“Employment laws by their very terms depend on the
identification of an employee and an employment relationship.”170
Behind that seeming tautology lies a strategic opportunity that
corporations learned to exploit over a century ago. Not all people who
do work for corporations qualify as their “employees.” Alternative
work arrangements have had many forms and gone by many names
over the decades: contract workers, temps, independent contractors,
gig workers, etc. They cover every major industry, from transportation,
construction, and hospitality, to office work, medicine, and information
technology.171 By strategically delegating operations to nonemployee
workers, corporations can eliminate legal liabilities they would face if
employees had undertaken identical tasks.172 This maneuver leaves
workers and society materially worse off. Legislative, judicial, and
scholarly responses pave a path that could also work for current
corporate efforts to replace employees with algorithms.
There are several reasons corporations might want nonemployee
workers. The most economically legitimate reason is that it is easier to
expand and contract a nonemployee workforce in response to market
demand.173 Temp agencies and gig workers are quick to fill any labor
shortage, and labor contracts end when corporate need peters out. The
less savory reason that many corporations prefer nonemployees is to
eliminate many of the obligations that employers ordinarily owe. On
average, legally mandated employee benefits and protections account
for about 30 percent of an employee’s cost.174 These benefits include
170. Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and
How It Ought To Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 296 (2001).
171. KATHERINE LIM, ALICIA MILLER, MAX RISCH & ELEANOR WILKING, INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTORS IN THE U.S.: NEW TRENDS FROM 15 YEARS OF ADMINISTRATIVE TAX DATA 38
(2019) (visualizing the prevalence of independent contractors across industries).
172. See Carlson, supra note 170, at 304–06, 314–15.
173. STANLEY NOLLEN & HELEN AXEL, MANAGING CONTINGENT WORKERS 22 (1996).
174. See U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., USDL-21-1094, EMPLOYER COSTS FOR EMPLOYEE
COMPENSATION — MARCH 2021, at 1 (2021) (finding that the average cost to employers for
civilian workers averaged $39.01 per hour with wages accounting for $26.84); see also Barbara
Weltman, How Much Does an Employee Cost You?, U.S. SMALL BUS. ASS’N (Aug. 22, 2019),
https://www.sba.gov/blog/how-much-does-employee-cost-you [https://perma.cc/V3UN-QSTM]
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401k and retirement plan contributions, unemployment insurance,
health insurance, and paid time off for vacation, parental leave, and
sick days.175 Employee protections include nondiscrimination,
workplace safety, collective bargaining rights, and the like.176 Of
particular concern for this Article, one important liability that
corporations can also avoid by using nonemployees is liability for
worker torts177 and crimes.178 Corporations jealously guard this legal
immunity for nonemployee misconduct.179
The back and forth between corporations trying to avoid
responsibility for workers and lawmakers reasserting corporate
accountability has lasted nearly a century. When corporations start to
abuse the so-called “contractor defense,” courts and lawmakers
respond by expanding the definition of “employment” to include
certain contract workers. Early corporate attempts to manipulate the
contractor defense in the late nineteenth century were rather
simplistic. One corporation tried to set the stage for the defense by
simply prohibiting a worker from using its name in interactions with

(“There’s a rule of thumb that the cost [of an employee] is typically 1.25 to 1.4 times the salary,
depending on certain variables.”).
175. See Weltman, supra note 174 (noting the mandatory added costs of an employee include
payroll costs such as the employer’s share of FICA, federal unemployment tax (FUTA), and state
unemployment taxes); see also Julia Tomassetti, The Contracting/Producing Ambiguity and the
Collapse of the Means/Ends Distinction in Employment, 66 S.C. L. REV. 315, 327–28 (2014)
(discussing the myriad of protections granted by employment status: “access to social insurance
and welfare benefits; protection against discrimination . . . ; the right to a healthy and safe
workplace; rights to a minimum wage and overtime pay; protected family and medical leave;
workplace organizing and collective bargaining rights; and certain privacy rights”).
176. See generally AFL-CIO, YOUR RIGHTS AT WORK 2–30 (2013) (describing substantive
legal protections for employees).
177. Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 393 (2003) (“Employers,
likewise, may avoid vicarious liability for the torts of their employees by hiring fewer employees
and more (potentially insolvent) independent contractors.”); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of
Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1261–71 (1984); Sproul v. Hemmingway, 31 Mass. (14
Pick.) 1, 5 (1833).
178. Stevens v. Spec, Inc., 637 N.Y.S.2d 979, 979 (1996) (absolving nightclub of liability for
assault perpetrated on guest by independent contractor); 2 CORPORATE COUNSEL GUIDELINES
§ 5:5 (2020) (describing the general rule for corporate criminal liability for conduct by an
employee and one exceptional case, United States v. Parfait Powder Puff Co., 163 F.2d 1008 (7th
Cir. 1947), where a court held a corporation liable for crimes of an independent contractor).
179. See Anderson v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 801 F.2d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding no
liability for a large corporation for an accident resulting from the negligent sandblasting of an
independent contractor); Huddleston v. Union Rural Elec. Ass’n, 841 P.2d 282, 285–86 (Colo.
1992) (en banc) (concerning a claim by an electric utility that they were not liable for a deadly
plane crash caused by an independent contractor pilot).
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customers.180 The Supreme Court determined that corporations would
have to try harder; merely manipulating surface features of the
employment relationship would not suffice to reclassify employees as
contractors.
In the early twentieth century, corporations became more
sophisticated by layering intermediary relationships between
themselves and their workers. Garment manufacturers would, for
example, contract with sweatshops to produce their products.181
Several other industries would utilize middlemen who employed
children.182 In so doing, corporations hoped to distance themselves
legally and reputationally from violations of worker protection and
child welfare laws. The intermediaries who directly employed these
workers were often judgment-proof and cared little for their public
image.183 New Deal legislators responded to such abuses in 1938 by
passing the Fair Labor Standards Act, which defined “employ”
expansively as “to suffer or permit to work.”184 The goal was to hold
end-user corporations to account for workplace violations even if they
used intermediary firms.185 Accordingly, the Supreme Court found in
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb186 that the Act applied “to many
persons and working relationships, which [beforehand] were not
deemed to fall within the employer-employee category.”187
The next major thrust and parry between corporations and
workers over the definition of employment came about in the 1970s
with the rise of “contingent labor.”188 Corporations were feeling
increasingly burdened by the various New Deal labor laws that

180. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U.S. 518, 523–24 (1889) (“The provision of the contract
that Corbett shall not use the name of the company . . . does not and cannot affect its
responsibility to third persons injured by his negligence, in the course of his employment.”).
181. Cynthia Estlund, Who Mops the Floors at the Fortune 500? Corporate Self-Regulation
and the Low-Wage Workplace, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 671, 688–89 (2008).
182. Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 929 n.5 (11th Cir. 1996).
183. Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 1, 20 (2010).
184. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
185. Bruce Goldstein, Marc Linder, Laurence E. Norton II & Catherine K. Ruckelshaus,
Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory
Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1015–18 (1999).
186. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
187. Id. at 729.
188. George Gonos, Evolution of the Law of Temporary Work in America, 10 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 233, 234 (2006).
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extended new protections to employees.189 Temporary work agencies
offered a solution. They facilitated triangular work relationships in
which the temp agencies formally served in the role of “employers”
who assigned their “employees” to work for end-user corporations.190
Temp agencies paid the workers, while end-user corporations
supervised their work.191 This allowed corporations to benefit from the
workers’ labor while “avoid[ing] most of the legal, social and
contractual obligations they held toward direct employees.”192 Workers
who felt their rights were being violated were largely limited to suing
the temp agencies who formally employed them, as were plaintiffs and
prosecutors alleging worker torts and crimes.193 The suits against temp
agencies were often to no avail. Many temp agencies would go
bankrupt or simply disappear when trouble came knocking.194 Today,
approximately sixteen million people work for temp agencies.195
As corporations disclaimed responsibility for temp workers, some
courts, regulators, and scholars pushed back by recharacterizing temp
workers as employees of end-user businesses. Scholars have proposed
various strategies for liberalizing the definition of employment to
accomplish this goal.196 Over the years, some courts have obliged. For
example, in 1992, temp workers sued Microsoft alleging that they
performed the same work as full employees and should be classified as

189. Kati L. Griffith, The Fair Labor Standards Act at 80: Everything Old Is New Again, 104
CORNELL L. REV. 557, 559–66 (discussing the cat-and-mouse game between business and
regulators in enforcement of the FLSA).
190. “Renting” Workers to Industry, FORTUNE, Sept. 1960, at 254 (describing the triangular
work relationships that arose in the mid-twentieth century).
191. Yuval Feldman, Ex-Ante vs. Ex-Post: Optimizing State Intervention in Exploitative
Triangular Employment Relationships, 30 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 751, 752 (2009).
192. Gonos, supra note 188, at 240.
193. Noah D. Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or Grasp of Employment Law, in THE
GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY: WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF AMERICA’S LABOR
MARKET 31, 37–42 (Annette Bernhardt, Heather Boushey, Laura Dresser & Chris Tilly eds.,
2008) (discussing the difficulties faced by employees in challenging actions by employers who
have spread their functions across multiple interlocking contractors).
194. Jonathan P. Hiatt, Policy Issues Concerning the Contingent Workforce, 52 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 739, 743 (1995).
195. See Annual Temporary and Contract Staffing Employment in the United States from 2000
to 2019, STATISTA (Aug. 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/220682/us-total-annual-temp
orary-employment [https://perma.cc/4S98-LTSU].
196. Stephen F. Befort, The Regulatory Void of Contingent Work, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 245, 253 (2006) (defining employee to include “workers who labor under subordinate
circumstances”); Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 35, at 1704–14 (proposing a broader
understanding of “control”).
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such for benefits purposes.197 Microsoft settled the suit in 2000 for $97
million.198 Courts have helped by recognizing the possibility of joint
employment relationships where the temp agency and the end-user
corporation could both count as employers of temp workers. For
example, in 2015, the Fourth Circuit determined that a temp worker
who performed the same tasks for a corporate end-user as other
employees could be considered an employee of the end-user in a Title
VII harassment claim.199 In 2016, the Department of Labor agreed,
committing itself to pursuing more joint employment claims against
end-user corporations who are “clearly playing games, and clearly
trying to shift responsibility [to temp agencies].”200 In 2020, a federal
court validated that approach.201
The most recent and sweeping corporate effort to reclassify
workers as nonemployees centers on the mushrooming “gig
economy.”202 Gig workers are independent contractors who perform
on-demand services.203 From Uber drivers to Airbnb hosts to Instacart

197. Dave Wilson, Microsoft To Pay $97 Million To End Temp Worker Suit, L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 13, 2000, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-dec-13-fi-64817-story.html
[https://perma.cc/R2VC-QFT6] (noting that “the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals found that
employers must make the same retirement benefits available to everyone” and those “who
worked for Microsoft for at least five months a year [were] entitled to money they would have
received if they had been able to purchase the company’s stock at a discount”).
198. Id.
199. Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., 793 F.3d 404, 415 (4th Cir. 2015). In Faush v.
Tuesday Morning, Inc., the Third Circuit reached a similar result for a temp worker claiming the
protections that Title VII extends to employees against race-based hostility. Faush v. Tuesday
Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 218–19 (3d Cir. 2015).
200. Lydia DePillis, Department of Labor Sends Warning Shot to Clients of Temp Staffing
Agencies, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2016, 8:57 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2016/01/20/department-of-labor-sends-warning-shot-to-clients-of-temp-staffing-agencies
[https://perma.cc/BNX2-JYJH] (discussing U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Wage & Hour Div., Opinion
Letter on Joint Employment Under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Protection Act (Jan. 20, 2016), 2016 WL 284582).
201. See New York v. Scalia, 490 F. Supp. 3d 748, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (determining the
Department of Labor’s 2020 departure from the 2016 interpretation was arbitrary and capricious
because the department did not justify the inconsistency).
202. Noam Scheiber, A Middle Ground Between Contract Worker and Employee, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/business/a-middle-ground-between-con
tract-worker-and-employee.html [https://perma.cc/55MR-8TQ5].
203. SARAH A. DONOVAN, DAVID H. BRADLEY & JON O. SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R44365, WHAT DOES THE GIG ECONOMY MEAN FOR WORKERS? 1 (2016), https://www.
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44365.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XFF-F7V8] (“[G]ig workers enter into formal
agreements with on-demand companies (e.g., Uber, TaskRabbit) to provide services to the
company’s clients.”).
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shoppers, the gig economy has exploded since the Great Recession204
to include fifty-five million independent contractors, or more than onethird of the total workforce.205 Far from considering these workers as
employees, corporations advance a narrative under which gig workers
are entrepreneurs who work only for themselves.206 Though Uber
recruits hundreds of thousands of “driver-partners” every month,207 it
claims that it “does not employ drivers or own any vehicles.”208
Corporations who rely on gig workers can exploit their classification as
independent contractors to save a lot of money.209 The law has largely
accepted the independent contractor narrative, which immunizes Uber
and other corporations from having to offer basic employment rights
and benefits.210 Uber claims this same defense immunizes it from

204. Marcin Zgola, Will the Gig Economy Become the New Working-Class Norm?, FORBES
(Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesbusinesscouncil/2021/08/12/will-the-gig-econ
omy-become-the-new-working-class-norm/?sh=5983ba86aee6 [https://perma.cc/6JMR-UM9Z].
205. Nandita Bose, U.S. Labor Secretary Supports Classifying Gig Workers as Employees,
REUTERS (Apr. 29, 2021, 11:50 AM), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/exclusive-us-labor-secre
tary-says-most-gig-workers-should-be-classified-2021-04-29 [https://perma.cc/U4BQ-S7QF] (“As
many as 55 million people in the United States were gig workers - or 34% of the workforce - in
2017, according to the International Labor Organization, and the total was projected to rise to
43% in 2020.”); TJ McCue, 57 Million U.S. Workers Are Part of the Gig Economy, FORBES (Aug.
31, 2018, 5:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tjmccue/2018/08/31/57-million-u-s-workers-arepart-of-the-gig-economy [https://perma.cc/73J2-U2BS] (“More than one third (36 percent) of
U.S. workers are in the gig economy, which works out to a very large number of approximately
57 million people.”).
206. Drive With Uber: An Alternative to Traditional Driving Jobs, UBER, https://
www.uber.com/us/en/drive [https://perma.cc/TNF5-KCW9] (discussing the benefits of driving for
Uber in terms of the flexibility to work when you choose).
207. Prahjeet Singh, Keeping Driver Partners at Heart, UBER (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://www.uber.com/en-IN/newsroom/keeping-driver-partners-at-heart [https://perma.cc/NW
89-TXJE]; see also Ellen Huet, Uber Is Adding ‘Hundreds of Thousands’ of New Drivers Every
Month, FORBES (June 3, 2015, 11:05 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/06/03/
uber-adding-hundreds-of-thousands-of-new-drivers-every-month [https://perma.cc/SDV2F6DH] (“Uber is adding ‘hundreds of thousands’ of drivers globally every month . . . and has
26,000 active drivers in New York, 15,000 in London, 10,000 in Paris and 22,000 in San Francisco,
the company said.”).
208. Goldberg v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 14-14264-RGS, 2015 WL 1530875, at *1 (D. Mass.
Apr. 6, 2015).
209. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 35, at 1689–90; Rogers, supra note 183, at 15.
210. Natasha Singer, In the Sharing Economy, Workers Find Both Freedom and Uncertainty,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/technology/in-the-sharingeconomy-workers-find-both-freedom-and-uncertainty.html [https://perma.cc/9BFA-NGAD]
(explaining that companies that rely on gig workers “require [them] to work as independent
contractors and, as such, the workers don’t qualify for employee benefits like health insurance,
payroll deductions for Social Security or unemployment benefits”); Orly Lobel, We Are All Gig
Workers Now: Online Platforms, Freelancers & the Battles over Employment Status & Rights
During the Covid-19 Pandemic, 57 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 919, 934 (2020) (“While gig companies
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liability for harm that Uber drivers cause, from physical injury to
passengers211 to discrimination against disabled customers.212
Once again, scholars’, regulators’, and courts’ solution to the
corporate accountability gap in the gig economy has been to recognize
that many corporations actually do employ their gig workers.213
According to one leading scholar, “there is a way to correct this
growing asymmetry [between corporations and gig workers], and it
begins by reassessing what it means to employ workers today.”214 The
U.S. labor secretary seems to agree; earlier this year, he announced his
support for classifying gig workers as employees,215 as the United
Kingdom already has done.216
Some courts are already pushing in that direction. The Ninth
Circuit and Kansas Supreme Court found in 2014 that drivers whom
FedEx classified as independent entrepreneurs were actually

profit from the increase in demand, gig workers have been typically classified as independent
contractors, working without health care benefits or sick leave options. Independent contractors
are also generally not covered by federal and state health and safety regulations.”).
211. E.g., Search v. Uber Techs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222, 232 (D.D.C. 2015) (rejecting
Uber’s argument that it did not employ a tortfeasor-driver); Anthony Juzaitis, The Liability
Impact of Gig Worker Status, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 14, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-the-liability-impact-of-gig-worker-status [https://perma.cc/
Z25C-4MAR] (“Classifying workers as employees helps protect consumers, too. The tort doctrine
of respondeat superior, for example, holds employers liable for injuries caused by their employees’
negligence . . . . Uber and other companies in the gig economy are trying to change all that.”); cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (AM. L. INST. 1965) (“Except as stated in [listed
section numbers], the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm
caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants.”).
212. E.g., Ramos v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. SA-14-CA-502, 2015 WL 758087, at *5 (W.D. Tex.
2015) (“Uber argues that it is not a place of public accommodation as a matter of law.”); see also
Agnieszka A. McPeak, Sharing Tort Liability in the New Sharing Economy, 49 CONN. L. REV.
171, 174 (2016) (“Uber classifies its drivers as independent contractors (and not employees) and
maintains that it is not a common carrier—classifications that save Uber from complying with
regulatory mandates and alter the liability analysis under tort law.”).
213. Perhaps seeing the writing on the wall, some tech companies are pro-actively
reclassifying their gig workers as employees. John Utz, What Is a “Gig”? Benefits for Unexpected
Employees, 62 PRAC. L. 19, 33 (2016) (“[T]here may be some modest trend toward intermediaries
in the gig economy choosing to treat gig workers as employees, including for employee benefit
plan purposes.”).
214. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 35, at 1677.
215. Bose, supra note 205 (“We are looking at it but in a lot of cases gig workers should be
classified as employees . . . .” (quoting Marty Walsh, U.S. Sec’y of Lab.)).
216. Uber BV v. Aslam [2021] UKSC 5, [92] (appeal taken from Eng.) (“[T]he findings of
the employment tribunal justified its conclusion that, although free to choose when and where
they worked, at times when they are working drivers work for and under contracts with Uber
(and, specifically, Uber London).”).
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employees.217 “[I]f a worker is hired like an employee, dressed like an
employee, supervised like an employee, compensated like an
employee, and terminated like an employee,” then they are an
employee regardless of academic corporate machinations.218 More
recently, California courts recognized that Uber and Lyft drivers are
employees entitled to benefits that the ride-sharing companies had
denied them.219 The California courts drew from a landmark 2018
precedent, Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court,220 which
held the definition of “employee” must be “interpreted and applied
broadly to include . . . all individual workers who can reasonably be
viewed as ‘working in the [hiring entity’s] business.’”221 In light of this
standard, Uber’s and Lyft’s classification of their drivers as
independent contractors “fl[ew] in the face of economic reality and
common sense . . . . To state the obvious, drivers are central, not
tangential, to Uber and Lyft’s entire ride-hailing business.”222
The preceding discussion begs the question of what the legal test
for employment is. For more than a century, courts evaluating
employment relationships have been prepared to look through
corporations’ proffered narrative. In 1914, Judge Learned Hand wrote
of a coal company that purported to lease mining rights to independent
miners from whom it then purchased coal: “It is absurd to class such a
217. Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 1033, 1047 (9th Cir. 2014); Craig
v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66, 92 (Kan. 2014).
218. Craig, 335 P.3d at 81.
219. People v. Uber Techs., Inc., 270 Cal. Rptr. 3d 290, 312–15 (2020), aff’g No. CGC-20584402, 2020 WL 5440308 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2020), review denied (Feb. 20, 2021) (affirming
the trial court’s preliminary injunction requiring Uber and Lyft to treat its employees under the
FLSA on the grounds that California was likely to succeed on the merits of its statutory claim).
220. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018).
221. Id. at 32 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 281 (Cal. 2010)).
222. People v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CGC-20-584402, 2020 WL 5440308, at *3 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Aug. 10, 2020). This decision was not the end of the saga over Uber and Lyft drivers in
California. In response to the decision, Uber and Lyft and other tech companies spent a record
$205 million to lobby for a ballot measure in California, Proposition 22, that would have
characterized drivers as independent contractors. Though the measure passed, many voters felt
they had been misled. Faiz Siddiqui & Nitasha Tiku, Uber and Lyft Used Sneaky Tactics To Avoid
Making Drivers Employees in California, Voters Say. Now, They’re Going National., WASH. POST
(Nov. 17, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/11/17/uber-lyftprop22-misinformation [https://perma.cc/7M9Y-XQTW]. In August 2021, a California trial court
ruled that Proposition 22 violated the California constitution and was unenforceable. Castellanos
v. State, No. RG21088725, 2021 WL 3730951, at *2–5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2021), appeal
docketed, No. A163655 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2021); Justin Ray, Prop. 22 Is Ruled
Unconstitutional: What It Means, How Apps Reacted and What Happens Next, L.A. TIMES (Aug.
23, 2021, 9:10 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/newsletter/2021-08-23/proposition-22lyft-uber-decision-essential-california [https://perma.cc/GE2T-HU5H].
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miner as an independent contractor . . . . He has no capital, no financial
responsibility . . . . By him alone is carried on the company’s only
business; he is their ‘hand,’ if any one is.”223 Today, courts use several
different tests for employment, depending on the legal right being
asserted.224 While the details of the tests vary, the control that a
corporation exercises over a worker from whom it benefits has
emerged as a defining element.225 Even in overcoming the general rule
that corporations are only liable for the torts and crimes of employees,
courts will treat independent contractors as employees where
corporations exercise sufficient control.226 In assessing the extent of
corporate control over a contractor, courts look through formalities to
consider “all of the incidents of the relationship”227 and assess the
“economic reality”228 of the situation.
As this Section has shown, corporations have a long history of
manipulating the formal definition of “employment” to benefit from
workers’ labor but to avoid liability for it. For over a century,
corporations have transferred productive capacity to nonemployees
like temp and gig workers who in many respects are functionally
identical to employees. This allowed corporations to immunize
themselves from legal requirements to respect employee rights and
benefits and, more importantly for purposes of this Article, to avoid
liability for workers’ torts and crimes. Now, by rapidly transferring
functionality to algorithms, corporations can recreate the same
immunities. For contract workers, the solution scholars and lawmakers
hit upon is to extend the law’s understanding of the employment
relationship to cover some independent contractors and the
corporations who ultimately control and benefit from their work. As
223. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552–53 (2d Cir. 1914).
224. Grant E. Brown, Comment, An Uberdilemma: Employees and Independent Contractors
in the Sharing Economy, 75 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 15, 17 (2016) (“These inconsistent tests [for
employment] are a result of the many different bodies of employment law.”).
225. Lisa J. Bernt, Suppressing the Mischief: New Work, Old Problems, 6 NE. U. L.J. 311, 319
(2014).
226. See Beil v. Telesis Constr., Inc., 11 A.3d 456, 466–67 (Pa. 2009); see also Bowers v. Trinity
Groves, No. 3:21-CV-0411-B, 2021 WL 3710564, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2021) (dismissing
Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice against the corporation that owned and operated the property
on which a valet company’s attendant allegedly stole a patron’s property).
227. NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968).
228. Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808, 813 (D.D.C. 1973) (“Economic reality is the test
of employment . . . .”); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 754–55 (9th Cir.
1979) (adopting a definition of “employee” that considers the economic realities of the work
relationship); Goldstein et al., supra note 185, at 1008 (“[C]ourts have used the economic reality
test to determine whether a putative employer has employed a worker . . . .”).
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proposed next, a similar approach could work for the algorithms that
are rapidly supplanting employees in today’s corporate workforce.
III. THE LABOR MODEL AND EMPLOYED ALGORITHMS
This Part proposes a concrete doctrine for making good on the
analogy between employees and algorithms: to assess corporate
liability for harms to third parties, the law should treat corporate
algorithms as though they were employees. This “Labor Model” would
allow plaintiffs and prosecutors to slot algorithms into corporate law’s
existing employee-focused liability rules. The Labor Model maintains
that employees and what it calls “employed algorithms” should be
legally interchangeable when assessing civil and criminal corporate
liability. If a corporation would be liable under existing law when a
human employee causes some harm, the corporation should also be
liable when an algorithm causes the harm instead. As argued below,
corporations are presently liable for employee misconduct when the
corporation expected to benefit from and exercised control over the
employee’s efforts. The Labor Model would extend those same two
elements of corporate liability—benefit and control—to algorithmic
harms.
A. Assessing Existing Models
Before broaching the complexities of the Labor Model offered
below, it is worth considering whether a simpler model could suffice.
Scholars have proposed two primary competing approaches. The Strict
Liability Model would automatically hold corporations accountable
any time one of their algorithms causes harm.229 The Negligence Model
would instead require evidence of negligence before forcing a
corporation to pay for algorithmic harm.230 Unfortunately, both models
perform poorly across the six criteria offered above: identify which
corporation is liable, foreclose opportunities for gamesmanship,

229. See, e.g., David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial
Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 146 (2014) (proposing a strict liability system to respond to
the problem of accidents involving autonomous vehicles); Anuj Puri, Moral Imitation: Can an
Algorithm Really Be Ethical?, 48 RUTGERS L. REC. 47, 47 (2020) (“I highlight the grave cost of
masking algorithmic injustices with ethical justifications and argue for strict liability for any firm
deploying algorithms in the public policy realm.”).
230. See, e.g., Ryan Abbott & Alex Sarch, Punishing Artificial Intelligence: Legal Fiction or
Science Fiction, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 323, 382 (2019) (“Very few laws specifically address AIgenerated harms, which means civil liability must usually be established under a traditional
negligence or product liability framework . . . .”).
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provide efficient incentives, generate fair outcomes, be easy to
implement, and promote programming values.231
The Strict Liability Model falls short on all six criteria. To start, it
does not say which of the many corporations typically involved with an
algorithm should pay (Criterion 1). Any simple answer—for example,
always the owner of the algorithm or always its developer—would
likely be manipulable by large, sophisticated corporations who are
anxious to shift liability risk to smaller, economically stressed,
underfunded, or less sophisticated partners (Criterion 2). Since the
Strict Liability Model promises to hold corporations liable for all
algorithmic harms (even if the harm is a fluke and perhaps if the victim
too may have been at fault), it risks overdeterring corporate investment
in algorithm innovation and unfairly punishing innocent corporations
(Criteria 3 and 4). Strict liability would also be a dramatic shift in the
fundamentals of corporate liability, likely to provoke significant
political challenges from corporations whose interests would be
impeded (Criterion 5).232 Finally, by treating all algorithms the same,
the no-fault approach risks encouraging corporations to ignore
important programming values (Criterion 6). If transparent processes
are just as likely to lead to liability as opaque processes, corporations
will use whichever algorithms are cheaper and better protect business
secrets.233 These tend to be black box algorithms.
The Negligence Model performs better than the Strict Liability
Model, but only marginally. It does have a built-in method for
identifying which corporation in the chain of production and operation
to hold liable: any corporation whose negligence contributed to the
algorithmic harm of concern (Criterion 1). However, the Negligence
Model performs poorly on the remaining criteria. As I and others have
extensively argued, corporate mental states, including negligence, are
inherently manipulable.234 As discussed above in connection with the
231. See supra Part I.C.
232. The no-fault approach does have some similarities to strict products liability. However,
as I have argued elsewhere, algorithms are typically not “products” within the meaning of that
liability scheme. Diamantis, Algorithms Acting Badly, supra note 32, at 823–26.
233. See Ben Dickson, The Dangers of Trusting Black-Box Machine Learning, TECHTALKS
(July 27, 2020), https://bdtechtalks.com/2020/07/27/black-box-ai-models [https://perma.cc/SQE2Y5FN] (“There are many cases where companies hide the details of their AI systems for
commercial reasons, such as keeping the edge over their competitors. But the problem with this
business model is that . . . it does nothing to minimize the harm and damage it does to the end
user . . . .”).
234. See, e.g., Mihailis E. Diamantis, Corporate Criminal Minds, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2049, 2050–51 (2016) (describing a case where “the court found the corporation not guilty”
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No Hands Problem, corporations can parcel out responsibilities among
several employees so that none possesses the mental state that would
trigger liability (Criterion 2).235 This means the Negligence Model
could incentivize corporations to strategically circumscribe employee
functions rather than to develop and operate their algorithms more
responsibly (Criterion 3). Consequently, victims will often find
themselves without recourse when they suffer algorithmic harms
(Criterion 4). Even though it allows for corporate gamesmanship, the
Negligence Model would likely still provoke stiff corporate opposition
since it would represent a decided shift toward more permissive norms
of corporate liability (Criterion 5). Currently, many corporate offenses,
including the most common corporate criminal offenses, require more
demanding mental states like purpose or knowledge.236 Finally, as with
the Strict Liability Model, the Negligence Model focuses on the
corporate defendant (was the defendant negligent?) and not on the
corporate algorithm. This means it has no way to selectively promote
algorithms that incorporate programming values like transparency
(Criterion 6).
B. Three Important Caveats
Before describing the Labor Model in detail, drawing explicit
attention to three scope limitations of the Model may avoid some
possible confusion. First, the Model applies only in the context of
determining corporate liability for harms. Outside of that context, the
Labor Model assumes that algorithms will be regarded as the
inanimate mechanisms that they are. For example, the Labor Model
offers no basis for granting algorithms any of the rights and protections
due to human employees, such as wages and benefits under labor law237
or fair treatment under antidiscrimination law.238 To emphasize this

because “no individual employee was so sloppy as to have been grossly negligent”); Victor H.
Kramer, Criminal Prosecutions for Violations of the Sherman Act: In Search of a Policy, 48 GEO.
L.J. 530, 540 (1960) (“[R]esponsibility in the modern corporation is diffused among so many
executives that it is difficult, if not impossible, to fix personal responsibility for the corporation’s
crime.”).
235. See Diamantis, Functional Corporate Knowledge, supra note 52, at 341–42; ALEXANDER
SARCH, CRIMINALLY IGNORANT: WHY THE LAW PRETENDS WE KNOW WHAT WE DON’T 231,
252 (2019).
236. See Diamantis, Functional Corporate Knowledge, supra note 52, at 322–23.
237. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 206 (establishing the federal minimum wage).
238. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (outlawing adverse employment actions based on “race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin”).
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limitation, the Labor Model refers to corporate algorithms that satisfy
its criteria as “employed algorithms” rather than “employees.”
The second caveat is that the Labor Model fills a gap in corporate
legal accountability but does not replace existing doctrines. If
corporations or individuals would be liable for some harm, algorithmic
or otherwise, under a legal theory available in current law, they would
remain liable under the same theory even after implementing the
Labor Model. For example, product liability laws would remain
unchanged. Where an algorithm could be characterized as both a
product and an employed algorithm, parties whom the algorithm
injures could pursue multiple theories of liability. Longstanding
experience dictates that some legal redundancy is helpful for holding
corporations accountable.239
As a third and final caveat, it should be noted that the Labor
Model does not purport to be a stand-alone doctrine of corporate
liability. It relies on existing liability law. The Labor Model simply
states when those liability laws could extend to algorithmic harms,
rather than solely those caused by employees. As will become clearer
in the next Part, the Labor Model’s reliance on existing doctrine is one
of its key strengths. But it also means that the Labor Model needs a
background framework to translate some elements of existing liability
rules to the algorithmic context. For example, it is clear what act
elements and mental state elements mean when human employees are
the source of harm: the law attributes to corporations the acts and
mental states of employees.240 But what do they mean for algorithms?
I have offered answers in prior work that, because they also draw
heavily on a comparison between algorithms and employees, would
resonate well with the Labor Model.241
239. See David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Criminal
Prosecution, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1271–82 (2016) (arguing that the “prosecution of
corporations is warranted even when individuals are prosecuted”); see also Darryl K. Brown,
Criminal Enforcement Redundancy: Oversight of Decisions Not To Prosecute, 103 MINN. L. REV.
843, 907 (2018) (“U.S. strategies of enforcement redundancy have a relatively strong track record
for some crimes such as public corruption.”).
240. Michael W. Tankersley, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Culpable Employees,
Attorney Ethics, and the Joint Defense Doctrine, 58 TEX. L. REV. 809, 831 (1980) (“The doctrine
of respondeat superior is then usually invoked to attribute the employee’s culpable acts to the
corporation.”); Abbott & Sarch, supra note 230, at 351 (“[R]espondeat superior . . . allows mental
states possessed by an agent of the corporation to be imputed to the corporation itself . . . .”).
241. See Diamantis, Algorithms Acting Badly, supra note 32, at 844–49 (offering an account
of what it means for a corporation to “act” through an algorithm); Diamantis, The Extended
Corporate Mind, supra note 23, at 918–23 (offering an account of what it means for a corporation
to have mental states, like purpose and knowledge, through an algorithm).
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C. Introducing the Labor Model
Under the Labor Model, corporations would be liable for the
harms of their employed algorithms just as they presently are for the
harms of their human employees. The key to the Model will be to
define what it means for a corporation to employ an algorithm. As Part
II.B argued, employees and algorithms present overlapping corporate
enforcement challenges. The law already has solutions to those
challenges so far as employees are concerned. Therefore, a natural
starting point in defining employed algorithms is the current law of
corporate liability for employee misconduct. The hope is that
extending the principles behind current law to the algorithmic context
will offer an attractive solution to the enforcement challenges of
algorithmic misconduct too.
The general rule for attributing civil and criminal violations of
employees to corporations is respondeat superior.242 The doctrine has
been flexible enough to survive two thousand years, from Roman times
through the Middle Ages and the Industrial Revolution and on to the
advent of the modern corporation.243 Perhaps it can handle the digital
era, too.
Respondeat superior has two requirements. At the time of the
violation, the employee 1) must have intended to benefit the
corporation and 2) must have been working within the scope of their
employment.244 Each requirement responds to one of the two
enforcement challenges discussed in Part II.B: the justice challenge and
the preventive challenge.
The justice challenge of holding corporations liable for employee
misconduct is to overcome the presumptive unfairness of vicarious

242. W. Robert Thomas, Why Corporations Became (and Remain) Persons Under the
Criminal Law, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 479, 489 (2018). In light of my hesitancy over Joanna
Bryson’s proposal that algorithms should be slaves, it may be ironic that respondeat superior
originated in ancient Roman slave law. See HOLMES, supra note 107, at 15–17. Meaning “let the
master answer,” the doctrine held slaveholders to account when their slaves hurt someone.
Christine W. Young, Comment, Respondeat Superior: A Clarification and Broadening of the
Current “Scope of Employment” Test, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 599, 599–601, 599 n.1 (1990).
243. See Young, supra note 242, at 600–11.
244. See, e.g., Parker v. Carilion Clinic, 819 S.E.2d 809, 819 (Va. 2018) (“[A]n employer is
liable for the tortious act of his employee if the employee was performing his employer’s business
and acting within the scope of his employment.” (quoting Kensington Assocs. v. West, 362 S.E.2d
900, 901 (Va. 1987))); Lundberg v. State, 255 N.E.2d 177, 179 (N.Y. 1969) (“An employee acts in
the scope of his employment when he is doing something in furtherance of the duties he owes to
his employer and where the employer is, or could be, exercising some control, directly or
indirectly, over the employee’s activities.” (citations omitted)).
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liability. Respondeat superior’s intent-to-benefit requirement does
this. Vicarious liability is most concerning when the agent’s and
principal’s interests diverge.245 But respondeat superior assures that a
corporation will not be liable for a violation if its employee’s only
possible motivation was to benefit themself or harm their employer.246
For example, if an employee embezzles corporate assets, they have
committed a crime, but generally not one that respondeat superior
would attribute to the corporation.247 By ensuring that the employee
was working for the corporation, respondeat superior limits itself to
cases where the employee was intuitively acting as the corporation.248
This alignment of purposes generates an overlapping practical identity
between the employee and the corporation. Respondeat superior
thereby limits itself to cases where employees seem less like third
parties and more like direct corporate embodiments.249
245. See, e.g., Osborne v. Lyles, 587 N.E.2d 825, 832, 834 (Ohio 1992) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority’s application of respondeat superior to an assault by an off-duty police
officer motivated by personal animus); Xue Lu v. Powell, 621 F.3d 944, 951–54 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Bybee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority for applying
respondeat superior in the case of an asylum officer who sexually harassed an applicant on the
grounds that the harassment fell far outside the interests of the agency); Hollinger v. Titan Cap.
Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1579–83 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Hall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
application of respondeat superior in the case of securities fraud committed by an employee acting
in the scope of his personal interest); see also Barbara Black, Application of Respondeat Superior
Principles to Securities Fraud Claims Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO), 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 825, 833–36 (1984) (discussing the challenges associated
with applying respondeat superior liability in securities fraud cases where the principal had no
knowledge of the fraud).
246. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(2) (AM. L. INST. 2006) (“An employee’s
act is not within the scope of employment when it occurs within an independent course of conduct
not intended by the employee to serve any purpose of the employer.”).
247. Puskala v. Koss Corp., 799 F. Supp. 2d 941, 947 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (“It is true that
Sachdeva was committing fraud against the company rather than on behalf of it, and that
therefore her fraud cannot be imputed to the company under respondeat superior.”).
248. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 186 (rev. ed. 2012) (“[R]espondeat
superior construes (indeed, constructs) the doer as a composite: the-employer-acting-throughthe-employee. When the conditions that permit this construction of the doer are present, ‘the
enterprise may be regarded as a unit . . . Employee’s acts sufficiently connected with the
enterprise are in effect considered as deeds of the enterprise itself.’” (quoting Fruit v. Schreiner,
502 P.2d 133, 141 (Alaska 1972))).
249. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909) (“We
see no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the corporation, which profits
by the transaction, and can only act through its agents and officers, shall be held punishable by fine
because of the knowledge and intent of its agents . . . .” (emphasis added)); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2006) (“When an employee commits a tort with
the sole intention of furthering the employee’s own purposes, and not any purpose of the
employer, it is neither fair nor true-to-life to characterize the employee’s action as that of a
representative of the employer.”).
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Focusing solely on corporations and their employees leaves out
another group that has a justice stake in corporate liability outcomes:
the shareholders and other corporate stakeholders who feel the brunt
of any corporate sanction.250 As a functional matter, respondeat
superior also forces them to pay vicariously for employee misconduct.
The intent-to-benefit requirement has a response to them, too. The
corporate enterprise is a productive undertaking for corporate
stakeholders, and, like any business venture, it carries some risk of
loss.251 Costs attributable to employee misconduct are no different
from any other business costs, so long as they come paired with a
potential upside.252 Respondeat superior’s intent-to-benefit
requirement ensures that employees are working to promote corporate
welfare (and, by extension, corporate stakeholder welfare) before
asking corporate stakeholders to pay for harms employees cause. “Just
as liability for damage can be equitably balanced against the
defendant’s fault, so it can be equitably balanced against his benefit.”253
Indeed, not forcing corporate stakeholders to pay would produce even
greater unfairness. “[I]t would be unjust to permit an employer to gain
from the intelligent cooperation of others without being responsible
for the mistakes, the errors of judgment and the frailties of those
working under his direction and for his benefit.”254
The preventive challenge of corporate liability for employee
misconduct is to justify corporate liability on preventive grounds when,
due to agency costs, corporations can never guarantee that their
employees will behave. This is where respondeat superior’s scope-ofemployment requirement comes into play. Respondeat superior does

250. See John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul To Damn: No Body To Kick”: An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 401 (1981) (“[W]hen
the corporation catches a cold, someone else sneezes.”); BARNALI CHOUDHURY & MARTIN
PETRIN, CORPORATE DUTIES TO THE PUBLIC 194 (2019) (“Fundamentally, it is impossible to
punish a corporation without indirectly affecting its individual stakeholders.”).
251. See The Reality of Investment Risk, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/investors/learn-toinvest/key-investing-concepts/reality-investment-risk [https://perma.cc/KZ9K-9ATT] (“The level
of risk associated with a particular investment or asset class typically correlates with the level of
return the investment might achieve.”).
252. See Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1484–85 (2009) (“There is nothing wrong with recognizing that it was
Siemens, not simply some of its officers or employees, who should be held legally
accountable. . . . The shareholders of Siemens benefitted from its success when it used bribery and
kickbacks to obtain contracts that generated billions of dollars of profit.”).
253. Glanville Williams, Vicarious Liability and the Master’s Indemnity, 20 MOD. L. REV. 220,
230 (1957).
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1958).
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not demand that corporations do the impossible. It just requires that
corporations exercise control where they have it. “An employee acts
within the scope of employment when performing work assigned by
the employer or engaging in a course of conduct subject to the
employer’s control.”255 The scope-of-employment requirement is a
proxy for assuring that corporations will only be liable for conduct they
had the power to prevent. This incentivizes corporations to implement
compliance measures—better monitoring, training, discipline, and
productivity metrics—to reduce the chance that employees will break
the law while on the job.256
Respondeat superior may have solved the enforcement challenges
of employee misconduct, but it does not currently apply to algorithms.
The doctrine “requires an employment relationship at the time of the
injury and with regard to the transaction resulting in it.”257 Since
algorithms are not employees, respondeat superior does not even get
off the ground. Even if the doctrine were to apply, no algorithm would
satisfy either of its elements. Algorithms cannot intend to benefit any
corporations because, lacking minds, algorithms cannot intend
anything. Without an employment relationship, algorithms never
operate within the scope of employment.
By limiting respondeat superior to human employees, the law
adopts a superficial understanding that overlooks the doctrine’s true
flexibility. Deeper principles are at work in respondeat superior. For
centuries, these principles manifested themselves in specific doctrinal
requirements tailored to an assumption about the nature of corporate
production—that it proceeds only through human effort. That
assumption no longer holds in the present era, where algorithms are
rapidly replacing human labor. By recovering the principles behind
respondeat superior, more generalized versions of its two elements
come into view that could flexibly apply to human and digital labor
alike.
The Labor Model of corporate liability requires two innovations.
The first is to recognize that corporations can employ algorithms.
Whatever formal limits there are on who or what can be an employee
in other contexts, for purposes of assessing corporate liability, the legal

255. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(2) (AM. L. INST. 2006).
256. See Fleming James, Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REV. 161, 168 (1954) (“Pressure
of legal liability on the employer therefore is pressure put in the right place to avoid accidents.”).
257. 30 C.J.S. Employer-Employee Relationship § 221, Westlaw (database updated Aug.
2022).
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concept of employment should extend to cover “employed
algorithms.” The second innovation is to define what employed
algorithms are by generalizing respondeat superior’s two elements.
Since the elements can meet the enforcement challenges in the context
of human employees, they may be able to resolve the structurally
similar enforcement challenges of algorithms.
The generalized version of respondeat superior is what I have
elsewhere called the “beneficial-control test.” The beneficial-control
test derives from deeper principles that are at play in the intent-tobenefit and scope-of-employment elements of respondeat superior.
The general idea is that these elements are designed to ensure that a
corporation is only liable for an employee violation if the corporation
expected to benefit from and controlled the employee’s conduct at the
time of the violation. Where human employees are concerned, the two
elements are serviceable proxies for benefit and control. Since the
elements are inapplicable to algorithms, courts would need to inquire
directly into whether a corporation claims substantial benefits from the
algorithm’s operation and exercises substantial control over it. In
assessing the benefits a corporation claims from an algorithm, courts
should avoid overlooking indirect benefits.258 Even if an algorithm does
not provide an immediate revenue stream, it might boost corporate
profitability by making operations more efficient or providing data to
help inform business strategies. Measuring corporate control over
algorithms requires a multifaceted approach. Relevant powers include
the power to design the algorithm, terminate its operation, modify it,
monitor it, and override it. None of these powers standing alone is
necessarily determinative of corporate control over an algorithm, but
the more powers a corporation has, the more control it has.
In sum, the Labor Model of corporate liability for algorithmic
harms largely mirrors respondeat superior’s approach to employee
harms. Corporations are potentially liable for the harms that their
employed algorithms cause. A corporation employs an algorithm if it
exercises beneficial control over it. The only remaining question is
whether the Labor Model is an appealing solution to the corporate
accountability gap and the enforcement challenges that algorithms
introduce. The next Part evaluates the Labor Model.

258. GEORGE E. DANNER, THE EXECUTIVE’S HOW-TO GUIDE TO AUTOMATION 139–48
(2019) (discussing the value of algorithms, how companies like Google and Uber have monetized
their algorithms, and the various ways companies can monetize their algorithms).
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IV. STRENGTH OF THE LABOR MODEL ACROSS ALL SIX
EVALUATIVE CRITERIA
The fact that the Labor Model could close the algorithmic
accountability gap does not necessarily mean that it is an appealing way
to do so. Part I.C offered six criteria by which to evaluate proposals for
holding corporations accountable for algorithmic harms. In Part III.A,
I showed that two prominent models—the Strict Liability Model and
the Negligence Model—perform very poorly. By contrast, as this Part
demonstrates, the six criteria show the Labor Model in a decidedly
favorable light.
Criterion 1. Identify Which Corporation(s) Will Be Liable. The
Labor Model has a built-in method for identifying which corporations
could be liable when an algorithm harms someone—only corporations
that employ the algorithm. As defined above, a corporation employs
an algorithm if the corporation claims substantial benefits from and
exercises substantial control over the algorithm’s operation. This
would be a fact-intensive inquiry. For the benefits prong, fact finders
would need to trace out both direct monetization (e.g., subscription
fees) and indirect monetization (e.g., data collection and resale) of the
algorithm at issue. For the control prong, they would need to balance
the various indicia of control discussed in the previous part.
In most cases of significant algorithmic harm, there will be at least
one corporation that employed the algorithm. Corporations that satisfy
either the control or benefits test with respect to an algorithm will
usually satisfy the other test too. This is because of corporations’ profit
motives. If they control a process, they will generally turn it to their
advantage (or, where that is not possible, terminate it). If they benefit
from a process, they will generally seek to control and amplify those
benefits.259 Sometimes there may even be multiple corporations that
count as employing an algorithm.260 Under the Labor Model, all of
them would be jointly liable for its harms in both criminal and civil
law.261

259. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919) (“A business corporation is
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”).
260. See Stewart v. Hudson Hall LLC, No. 20 Civ. 885, 2020 WL 8732875, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 19, 2020) (“[A]n individual may be employed by more than one entity.”).
261. Cf. New York v. Scalia, 490 F. Supp. 3d 748, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“Joint employers are
jointly and severally liable for damages for FLSA violations.”).
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There will be some algorithmic harms to which the Labor Model
would not apply, but in such cases, corporate liability would be
unnecessary or counterproductive. For example, where malicious
individuals or syndicates develop the sort of malware that has filled
recent headlines, there is usually no affiliated corporation.262 However,
since individual malware developers purposely design their algorithms
to inflict criminal and civil harm, existing liability principles suffice for
holding them directly liable.263 There may also be rare instances where
there are corporate actors affiliated with a harmful algorithm but none
that would count as employing the algorithm under the Labor Model.
As explained with respect to Criteria 3 and 4 below, these are cases
where corporate liability would undermine either fairness or efficiency.
Criterion 2. Be Robust Enough to Avoid Gamesmanship. The
Strict Liability and Negligence Models discussed in Part III.A would
open new strategies for corporations to continue business as usual
while avoiding liability for algorithmic harms. This is because neither
model appreciates just how flexible corporations can be. The Strict
Liability Model would hold a corporation that owns or operates an
algorithm liable for all harms the algorithm causes. Ownership and
operation are the types of formalistic relationships that creative
corporations can work around using licensing agreements and business
partnerships. The Negligence Model would require plaintiffs and
prosecutors to prove that a corporation’s negligence contributed to the
algorithmic harm they allege. However, as explained above, corporate
mental states like negligence are inherently manipulable through
careful tailoring of employee functions and information flow.264 This
can make corporate mental states difficult or impossible to prove.
A key advantage of the Labor Model is that it shuns formalistic
criteria in favor of functional tests that track “economic reality” rather
than surface appearances.265 This Article has repeatedly emphasized
the functional similarities between human employees and corporate
262. See, e.g., Raphael Satter, Up to 1,500 Businesses Affected by Ransomware Attack, U.S.
Firm’s CEO Says, REUTERS (July 6, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/technology/hackers-demand70-million-liberate-data-held-by-companies-hit-mass-cyberattack-2021-07-05 [https://perma.cc/
QM64-REFG] (describing an attack by a group of hackers).
263. Abbott & Sarch, supra note 230, at 369–73.
264. See supra Part I.A.
265. Martin v. Sprint United Mgmt. Co., 273 F. Supp. 3d 404, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“As to
the functional control test, the Second Circuit has identified a number of factors pertinent to
determining whether a person or entity, even if lacking formal control, exercised ‘functional
control’ over an employee.”).
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algorithms. The Labor Model taps into those similarities. With respect
to individual employees, “the [Supreme] Court has instructed that the
determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists
. . . should be grounded in ‘economic reality rather than technical
concepts,’ determined by reference not to ‘isolated factors, but rather
upon the circumstances of the whole activity.’”266 Accordingly, the
Labor Model looks beyond manipulable surface features to the
substance of corporations’ relationships to their algorithms.
Corporations can easily change ownership of an algorithm without
materially altering their true involvement with it. That is not true of the
relationships of benefit and control that the Labor Model tracks.
Courts applying the Labor Model would not recite wooden elements
to define employment267 but would instead follow the California
Supreme Court’s lead in Dynamex, a case that recognized that many
independent contractors can nonetheless be employees.268 To
manipulate the Labor Model, a corporation would have to forgo either
the benefits of an algorithm or its control over the algorithm—direct
and indirect. No mere legalistic turn of phrase could accomplish that.
Criterion 3. Give Efficient Incentives to All Parties Involved. Since
the Labor Model draws on the existing framework for corporate
liability, it leverages efficiencies that are already present in that system.
These include the balance of responsibilities struck between victims
and wrongdoers to avoid harm. With respect to potential corporate
wrongdoers, recall that the goal is to induce corporations to implement
efficient levels of compliance. Even though agency costs mean
corporations can never guarantee employees will obey the law,
appropriate training and monitoring can reduce the probability of a
violation. Machine learning algorithms present a similar challenge—
there are no guarantees that they will never hurt someone. The Labor
Model meets that challenge for algorithms just as respondeat superior
meets it for employees—by incentivizing better compliance. In the
context of algorithms, better compliance means diversifying the body
266. Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 2008) (citations
omitted) (first quoting Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961); and then
quoting Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947)).
267. Barfield, 537 F.3d at 143 (“[There is] no rigid rule for the identification of an FLSA
employer.”).
268. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 39 (Cal. 2018) (“[A] business
cannot unilaterally determine a worker’s status simply by assigning the worker the label
‘independent contractor’ or by requiring the worker, as a condition of hiring, to enter into a
contract that designates the worker an independent contractor.”).
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of engineers writing algorithms,269 more careful initial programming,270
more mindful selection of training data sets,271 more extensive prerollout testing,272 regular post-rollout quality audits,273 routine run-time
compliance layers,274 effective monitoring,275 and continuous software
updates to address problems as they arise.276 None of these steps can
guarantee that a machine learning algorithm will follow the law, but
they can reduce the probability that it will go astray.277 By holding

269. See Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June 25,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white-guyproblem.html [https://perma.cc/HZ8J-MWK3].
270. See Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort Liability,
Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1611, 1634–36 (2017)
(contemplating coding errors that cause crashes of autonomous vehicles).
271. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 677; Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Engaging Rational
Discrimination: Exploring Reasons for Placing Regulatory Constraints on Decision Support
Systems, 12 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 29, 30 (2010) (discussing how bad data can bias automated
systems).
272. Geistfeld, supra note 270, at 1651–54; see Dave Cliff & Linda Northrop, The Global
Financial Markets: An Ultra-Large-Scale Systems Perspective 29 (2012) (unpublished conference
paper) (discussing the need for testing trading algorithms using simulations).
273. See Balázs Bodó, Natali Helberger, Kristina Irion, Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius,
Judith Moller, Bob van de Velde, Nadine Bol, Bram van Es & Claes de Vreese, Tackling the
Algorithmic Control Crisis—The Technical, Legal, and Ethical Challenges of Research into
Algorithmic Agents, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 133, 142–44 (2017) (describing audits of algorithms);
James Guszcza, Iyad Rahwan, Will Bible, Manuel Cebrian & Vic Katyal, Why We Need To Audit
Algorithms, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 28, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/11/why-we-need-to-auditalgorithms [https://perma.cc/QXD6-LB8L]. See generally Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Sean K.
Hallisey, “Equality and Privacy by Design”: A New Model of Artificial Intelligence Data
Transparency via Auditing, Certification, and Safe Harbor Regimes, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 428,
429 (2019) (proposing “an auditing regime”); Shea Brown, Jovana Davidovic & Ali Hasan, The
Algorithm Audit: Scoring the Algorithms That Score Us, 8 BIG DATA & SOC. 1 (2021) (proposing
a framework for ethically assessing algorithms).
274. See Felippe Meneguzzi & Michael Luck, Norm-Based Behaviour Modification in BDI
Agents, PROC. 8TH INT’L CONF. ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS & MULTIAGENT SYS. 177, 177–78
(2009); Louise Dennis, Michael Fisher, Marija Slavkovik & Matt Webster, Formal Verification of
Ethical Choices in Autonomous Systems, 77 ROBOTICS & AUTONOMOUS SYS. 1, 2–3 (2016).
275. Thomas C. King, Nikita Aggarwal, Mariarosaria Taddeo & Luciano Floridi, Artificial
Intelligence Crime: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Foreseeable Threats and Solutions, 26 SCI. &
ENG’G ETHICS 89, 110–12 (2019) (discussing four possible monitoring mechanisms for
algorithms).
276. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES
POLICY: ACCELERATING THE NEXT REVOLUTION IN ROADWAY SAFETY 16 (2016), https://
www.hsdl.org/?view&did=795644 [https://perma.cc/C9V6-K86D] (envisioning manufacturers of
self-driving cars will update software regularly to improve safety).
277. See generally William D. Smart, Cindy M. Grimm & Woodrow Hartzog, An Education
Theory of Fault for Autonomous Systems, 2 NOTRE DAME J. ON EMERGING TECHS. 33 (2021)
(describing ways to reduce educational failures in algorithms). For a detailed treatment on how
bias can arise in algorithms, see Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, Learning Algorithms
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corporations liable for algorithmic harms, the Labor Model would
induce corporations to take preemptive care with their algorithms so
as to avoid the greater expense of liability down the road.
The Labor Model recognizes that more compliance is not always
better from an efficiency perspective. The efficient level of compliance
is a moving target that ultimately depends on balancing two costs: the
costs of the potential harm and the often substantial costs of
implementing compliance to prevent that harm.278 Lawmakers strike a
balance between under- and overincentivizing corporate compliance
by tailoring liability standards.279 One central technique for adjusting
liability standards is to use more or less demanding mens rea
requirements. At the lowest end are strict liability standards, which
incentivize aggressive and sweeping compliance programs. More
demanding mens rea, like purpose, give corporations more leeway to
gauge what type and how much compliance is appropriate. A review of
the statutes that corporations commonly confront reveals a wide range
of mens rea, from strict liability to purpose and everything in between.
No single one of these mens rea would be appropriate in all
circumstances. That is part of why the Strict Liability and Negligence
Models fall short. The Labor Model has the potential to strike a more
efficient balance because it preserves current law’s liability standards
and extends them to the algorithmic context.280
Some scholars might find fault in the Labor Model’s reliance on
current law. Many believe that the present system of corporate liability
is inefficient. Criticisms range from arguing that it induces corporations
to invest too little in compliance to arguing that it forces far too

and Discrimination, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 88,
91 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018).
278. See William S. Laufer, A Very Special Regulatory Milestone, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 391,
408–09 (2019) (discussing the “public-private sector compliance relationship” as a “regulatory
equilibrium”); Hui Chen & Eugene Soltes, Why Compliance Programs Fail—and How To Fix
Them, 96 HARV. BUS. REV. 116, 118–19 (2018) (“Many executives are rightly frustrated about
paying immense and growing compliance costs without seeing clear benefits. And yet they
continue to invest—not because they think it’s necessarily productive but because they fear
exposing their organizations to greater liability should they fail to spend enough.”).
279. See generally Diamantis, The Corporate Insanity Defense, supra note 50 (discussing the
influence of definitions of mens rea on corporate investment in compliance).
280. See Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 341
(1996) (arguing that the imposition of criminal liability on corporations lacking the necessary
mens rea will force corporations to overinvest in precautions and forgo beneficial activities).
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much.281 Even assuming one side is right, the problem they point to
would be a much bigger feature of the U.S. approach to corporate
liability, not a defect of the Labor Model in particular. Any proposal
that would make the current law of corporate liability more efficient
would automatically improve the Labor Model, too. For example,
some commentators advocate a due diligence defense, which would
allow corporations to defeat criminal liability by demonstrating that
they had reasonable compliance systems in place at the time of the
alleged crime.282 Were such a defense implemented, it would apply to
criminal liability for algorithmic harms too.
Criterion 4. Produce Fair Outcomes. The Labor Model generates
fair outcomes that mirror the balance of equities already struck in the
existing law of corporate liability. The law owes due consideration both
to victims of algorithmic misconduct and to corporations that might be
liable for such misconduct. By treating algorithmic harms like those
committed by employees, the Labor Model updates current law to give
plaintiffs and prosecutors the same reasonable path to satisfaction for
algorithmic misconduct that they presently have for employee harms.
At the same time, since the Labor Model only pairs anticipated
corporate liabilities with anticipated corporate benefits, it is fair to
corporate stakeholders. The risk of loss that corporate stakeholders
face from liability for algorithmic harms resembles the generic business
risk that accompanies any gainful venture.
As with efficiency, not everyone agrees that the current law of
corporate liability is fully fair. Again, criticisms exist at both poles—
that the law puts a thumb on the justice scale in favor of corporations
or against them.283 This is not the place to arbitrate which side is right.
Any existing faults are not particular to the Labor Model. Since the
Labor Model draws on the general law of corporate liability, it would
automatically incorporate any improvements to the law’s fairness.

281. Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 742 (1997) (arguing that a civil liability
system would be more efficient than the current system of criminal liability for firms).
282. Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate World Mandates a “Good Faith” Affirmative Defense,
44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1537, 1537–38 (2007).
283. Compare William S. Laufer, The Missing Account of Progressive Corporate Criminal
Law, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 71, 79–80 (2017) (discussing legal structures that protect corporations
from real accountability), with Hasnas, supra note 115, at 1329 (arguing that corporate liability is
unfair to corporations).
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Criterion 5. Have Low Barriers to Implementation. The Labor
Model’s pragmatic virtues extend to the ease with which it could be
implemented. As explained in Part III, the Labor Model derives from
the same legal principles as the current general law of corporate
liability. Since judges developed that law with human employees in
mind, they could extend its internal logic to cover the newly evolving
digital workforce. The Strict Liability and Negligence Models are more
radical departures from current law that would likely require legislative
intervention. If the recent history of fractious and deadlocked politics
teaches us anything, it is that legislation is an unreliable path to
progress.
Even if the Labor Model would require congressional action, it
should face fewer political barriers than the alternatives. Any change
to the status quo will provoke opposition from those upon whom the
burdens of the change fall. Corporations that use algorithms will
mobilize against any effort to hold them liable, but they would mobilize
more determinedly against the Strict Liability and Negligence
approaches. These would both lower the bar for the many causes of
action against corporations that require something more than
negligence. The Labor Model brings the existing texture of the current
corporate liability landscape to algorithmic harms. Forward-looking
corporations may even endorse the compromises implicit in the Labor
Model.284 Doing so could fill the space left by the algorithmic
accountability gap before political pressure materializes for a more
aggressive alternative.
Criterion 6. Promote Programming Values. Corporate liability
should encourage corporations to integrate programming values like
transparency into the planning for their algorithms. Recall that
algorithmic transparency is the property of having an internal logic that
human onlookers can understand and use to reconstruct and evaluate
an algorithm’s decisions. Many machine learning algorithms are
programmed using techniques that turn them into incomprehensible
black boxes. Neither the Strict Liability nor the Negligence Model has
any mechanism for distinguishing between transparent and black box
algorithms. Both models focus on the corporation and the harm, but

284. See Kirsten Lucas, Marcel Hanegraaff & Iskander De Bruycker, Lobbying the
Lobbyists: When and Why Do Policymakers Seek To Influence Advocacy Groups in Global
Governance?, 8 INT. GRPS. & ADVOC. 208, 211–12 (2019) (noting that policy makers may work
with advocacy groups “in an effort to alter or moderate the advocacy groups’ stance”).
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not on the algorithm itself. Without any sensitivity to the properties of
the algorithm, neither model can selectively promote transparent
algorithm design.
One way to address that deficiency would be to mandate
transparency for certain types of algorithms. This heavy-handed
approach, which the European Union may soon adopt,285 overlooks the
nuance of programming values. While transparency is, all things equal,
preferable to opacity, it does come with costs. Some of these costs are
just business expenses for the higher price tag that can come with
developing transparent algorithms. More concerning are the costs to
potential victims. Because of the different programming techniques
involved, transparent algorithms can be less accurate than black box
algorithms for certain tasks.286 When algorithms are in charge of
approving home mortgages and driving cars, inaccurate decisions can
have devastating consequences. A one-size-fits-all approach to
transparency will not always maximize welfare. Rather than require
transparency, the law should induce corporations to weigh the
desirability of transparency on a case-by-case basis. The challenge is to
get corporations’ profit-driven assessments to align with outcomes that
promote social welfare.
The Labor Model would incentivize corporations to balance
transparency and accuracy in socially desirable ways. To see why, it will
help first to consider how corporations respond to traditional
allegations of misconduct, where an employee is the source of harm.
For example, plaintiffs may present evidence of a discriminatory
pattern of lending practices that originates with a particular corporate
employee. In defense, the corporation would likely call on the
employee to testify that the pattern is a coincidental result of legitimate
business justifications, not discriminatory purposes. The corporation
would be at a significant disadvantage if its employee were unavailable.
The employee is in the best position to dispel suspicion by explaining
their own thought processes. Without that explanation, the suspicious
conduct must stand for itself in the eyes of judge and jury.
A well-designed transparent algorithm can give corporations the
same courtroom advantage as a credible employee witness. If a lending
285. See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and
Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, COM (2021) 206 final (Apr. 4, 2021).
286. Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent and
Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 889, 893–94 (arguing that creating transparent algorithms will
come at the cost of decreased functionality).
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algorithm generates what, by coincidence rather than design, looks like
a discriminatory pattern of decisions, the corporation could, as it were,
put a transparent algorithm on the stand. Since a transparent
algorithm’s decision process is available and humanly comprehensible,
others can see whether it relied directly or indirectly on applicants’
protected characteristics.287 A black box algorithm is like an employee
who refuses to testify.288 Suspicious conduct becomes much harder to
explain away. Because the Strict Liability and Negligence Models
flatten all liability standards to a uniformly low threshold, they leave
corporations with very little opportunity to mount a defense to alleged
algorithmic harm. The Labor Model preserves the rich texture of
current civil and criminal law. Where the law requires heightened
levels of fault, like purpose or knowledge, the explanation that
transparency allows can be a powerful defense to liability.
The Labor Model would also induce corporations to balance
accuracy against transparency in socially desirable ways. Corporations
have a self-interest in ensuring that their algorithms make accurate
decisions (e.g., ones not premised on racial criteria), since errors can
lead to injuries (e.g., racial discrimination), and injuries to lawsuits
(e.g., under fair lending laws). Even under the Labor Model,
corporations will opt for black box algorithms when doing so could
yield a significant boost to accuracy. This might lower the prospect of
being sued in the first place. When achieving transparency does not
overly compromise accuracy, corporations will pursue transparency in
order to avail themselves of legal defenses when things go wrong. This
is the sort of tradeoff between accuracy and transparency that would
promote social welfare.
CONCLUSION
“Liability is one of the big unspoken-about issues here . . . . We
want to ensure there’s responsibility at the end of the day and that they
are not just passing that along to someone else.”289 That is how Lorena
287. Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in
Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181, 221 (2017) (arguing for a robust methodology for
understanding the way that algorithmic decisions are made).
288. Id. at 188–90 (discussing the barriers to understanding algorithmic decision-making).
289. Greg Bensinger, Uber: The Ride-Hailing App that Says It Has ‘Zero’ Drivers: The Silicon
Valley Company’s Word Games Help Shelter It from Liability in Lawsuits, WASH. POST (Oct. 14,
2019, 1:16 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/14/uber-ride-hailing-appthat-says-it-has-zero-drivers [https://perma.cc/N3Z8-LK23] (quoting Lorena Gonzalez, Cal.
Assemblywoman).
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Gonzalez, a California assemblywoman, described her motivation just
two years ago for crafting bill AB5, which reclassified much of the gig
workforce in California as employees. Large tech companies in
California like Uber and Amazon use independent contractors to
perform high-risk jobs like driving passengers and delivering packages.
In so doing, these corporations avoid millions in liabilities for civil and
criminal injuries they would have to pay had they used employees
instead.290 Legislators,291 regulators,292 and judges293 are pushing back
against this corporate gambit, and its availability as a tool to hide from
victims of business torts and crimes may not last long.
But corporations have already uncovered the next frontier of
liability management. Independent contractors are not the only source
of nonemployee labor. Algorithms are increasingly capable of
performing tasks that corporations assigned to employees just a decade
ago. Since algorithms are not employees, doctrines for holding
corporations liable when people get hurt apply awkwardly, if at all.
Corporations are increasingly taking advantage of this liability
loophole. Assemblywoman Gonzalez’s words and motivations could
just as easily apply to the digital workforce of corporate algorithms as
to gig workers.
Similar solutions often work for similar problems. Or so this
Article has argued. The leading proposals for addressing corporate
abuses of the gig workforce all involve reclassifying certain
independent contractors as employees. The Labor Model advanced
here would do the same for corporate algorithms. Corporate liability
generally requires employee misconduct. For purposes of assessing
whether a corporation is liable for a civil or criminal harm caused by
an algorithm, the Labor Model recognizes that some algorithms should
count as corporate employees. Drawing on the principles embedded in
the existing doctrines of corporate liability, the Labor Model defines
an employed algorithm as one from which a corporation derives
substantial benefits and over which it exercises substantial control.
With this approach, there would be parity between algorithmic and
employee harms. Corporations would be liable for the former just as

290. Kevin Alden, Strict Liability for the Information Age, 46 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1619, 1620
(2021) (“[Amazon] has been able to avoid liability for the ten deaths and sixty other ‘serious
injuries’ caused by their vehicles by placing a legal firewall between itself and the drivers . . . .”).
291. 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 296 (West) (Assembly Bill No. 5).
292. Bose, supra note 205.
293. Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 39 (Cal. 2018).
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they presently are for the latter. The Labor Model would induce
corporations to develop algorithms responsibly while recognizing that
robots, like employees, are most valuable when they do not strictly
follow orders given by human beings.

